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ABSTRACT
Rhetoric associated with the development of nuclear power in the United States
was analyzed over 3-decades in order to better understanding the beginnings and
constituents of the rhetoric associated with anti-nuclear power perspectives. An
amalgamation of existing historical/rhetorical methods utilized by Gamson and Modigliani
(1989) and Darsey (1991) were employed. Progressive interpretive anti-nuclear rhetorical
packages were identified for corresponding historical periods within the 34-year period.
Historical periods were segmented by catalytic events, or incidents important to nuclear
power development which also presented opportunities for anti-nuclear power rhetoric.
The analysis reveals four individual rhetorical packages: 1) Pandora’s Box; 2) Mirage; 3)
Devil’s Bargain, and; 4) Mirage Two. The analysis further demonstrates that anti-nuclear
rhetoric is progressive, synergistic, requires maintenance, relies on the unknown, and
exists beyond what is reported in the media.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

I oppose nuclear energy [because] man has not suflBciently mastered the technology of
the atom to justify the siting of nuclear power plants anywhere on earth, let alone in
highly populated communities.
—Senator Edward Kennedy, New York Times

In this process the involved scientific community has been essentially ignored. We are
inexperienced and inept at political or media gamesmanship. The problem is that our
case is based on science, while the anti-nuclear case is based on political philosophy.
—Bernard L. Cohen, Before It's Too Late - A Scientist's Case For
Nuclear Energy

In the predawn hours of July 16, 1945, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer waited
anxiously in a small observation shelter at a desolate site named Trinity in the New Mexico
desert. The focus of his concern was a soon-to-be tested plutonium implosion bomb, aptly
named "Jumbo," which sat atop a 100-foot tall steel tower. Oppenheimer had spent two
years directing the efforts of an elite cadre of scientists at a secret laboratory in Los
Alamos, New Mexico toward this moment.
At approximately 45 seconds after 5:29 in the morning, a radio signal was
activated detonating "Jumbo" with an explosive force equal to nearly 20,000 tons of TNT.
Oppenheimer who had been looking out the back door of the shelter, away from the blast,
would later report that for an instant the desert was "bleached to a ghastly white" (Cahn,
1995, p. 10). Through Oppenheimefs mind flashed a passage from the sacred Hindu text,
the Bhagavad-Gita: "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds" (Cahn, 1995, p.
10) For a instant there was silence in the shelter - then Oppenheimer and the other
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scientists ran outside.
From the outside of the shelter, 10,000 yards from the explosion, scientists could
see a quarter-mile-wide ball of reddish-yellow flame and smoke violently churning over
ground zero. As the fireball continued to expand it rapidly climbed upward, sucking up
desert and debris into a column that within half a minute extended a mile into the sky.
Philip Morrison, another young physicist working at Los Alamos was much further
from the blast than Oppenheimer, but still recalled the event vividly:
The Trinity Test went off as planned on July 16, 1945, leaving lifelong indelible
memories. None is as vivid for me as that brief flash of heat on my face, sharp as
noonday for a watcher 10 miles away in the cold desert predawn, while our own false
sun rose on the earth and set again. (Morrison, 1995, p. 33)
It was the first hour of the first day of the nuclear age, and nothing would ever be
the same. Twenty-one days later, on August 6, the B-29 bomber Enola Gay flew into
history by dropping the first atomic weapon on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. On
August 9, a second and final atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki.
The duel atomic bombings of Japan not only brought a swift end to the second
World War, they also changed the nature of warfare forever, signaling the start of an arms
race that is still unfolding: "At times, the threat of nuclear war has cast a long shadow over
the lives of Americans." (Stover, August 1995) But the nuclear technology revealed 50years ago has had an even more lasting impact on the daily lives of the American public.
Many Americans do not seem to give much thought to the power of the atom
when they turn on their computers, televisions or microwave ovens. But nearly 21 percent
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of the electricity currently produced in the United States comes from nuclear power plants
that are direct descendants of the atomic weapon. (“Nuclear Technology Milestones,”
1992) Shortly after the United States atomically razed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists
and politicians who helped develop atomic weapons began to look for more peaceful
applications for the destructive force they had unleashed.
In nuclear power, they saw a potentially inexhaustible supply of electricity. Early
advocates of nuclear power proclaimed that it was a clean, safe source of energy with a
flawless operating record. Others heralded nuclear power as one of the twentieth
century's greatest scientific and technological achievements. By controlling the fission
(splitting) of atoms, enormous quantities of energy could be harnessed to provide heat that
would, in theory, run electric turbines indefinitely. The production of nuclear power also
required relatively limited amounts of uranium fuel, which could be cheaply mined,
processed or reprocessed.
Typically, this optimistic view o f nuclear energy also lent itself to misconceptions
and often fanciful predictions of the possible uses of power from the atom. In one account
from 1946, "no baseball game will be called off on account of rain," because chunks of
uranium, "artificial suns," mounted on towers would create controlling weather patterns.
(Williams, 1992, p.25)
Even various contemporary views of nuclear power, although not quite as fanciful,
still extol that, "the outlook for nuclear energy is as bright as its past accomplishments."
(Williams, 1992, p.25) Phillip Bayne, President of the Nuclear Energy Institute in
Washington D.C., declared in 1994 that "the dual goals of a clean environment and a
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strong economy can only be met if the country increases its use of nuclear energy" (“End
of a Nuclear Road,” 1994).
Others who have observed and followed the development of the atom, however,
do not share the same optimistic view of nuclear power. "This new confidence that we
had a source of energy that would free us fi-om dependence on imported oil and provide
nations with a plentiful supply of energy for eons without any threat to human life has
been seriously eroded" (Price, 1982, p. 1).
Presently, opponents assert that nuclear energy is already a failed technology
which exists only because of massive government subsidies. Some opponents have
prematurely announced the death of nuclear energy: "the once bright world of nuclear
power has already gone dark" (“End of a Nuclear Road,” 1994). Other concerns such as
nuclear plant accidents, uncertainty over the disposal of radioactive wastes and increasing
costs continue to be catalysts for continued rhetoric from organizations opposed to the
use of nuclear energy. An archetypal example of this rhetoric is a poster showing the
silhouette of a mother and child which reads, "What do you do in case of nuclear accident:
kiss your children goodbye." (Grant, 1988, p. 30)
Thus, nuclear energy has been viewed as either incredible success or inevitable
failure as it developed alongside and in the shadow of its sibling, the nuclear weapon. Just
40 years ago, nuclear energy was an exotic technology, the subject of experiments and
science fiction. Forty-years later, nuclear energy, with more than 100 operating plants in
34 states, is the subject of controversy. And as a possible source of electrical energy in
the United States in the future, the fate of nuclear energy is at best uncertain.
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That uncertainty stems from a highly publicized struggle over the use and future
development of nuclear power. As a descendant of the atomic age, nuclear power has
fostered different beliefs about its necessity since its emergence. Those beliefs developed
into partisan viewpoints among like-minded individuals, which ultimately led to the
formation of two, well-organized and opposing groups; one pro-nuclear power
development and the other anti-nuclear power development. Currently, groups such as
Public Citizen, Sierra Club and Critical Mass Energy Project oppose nuclear energy, while
the Nuclear Energy Institute and U.S. Council for Energy Awareness support its
continued use.
The rhetoric associated with and pervasive to the pro-nuclear development groups
has been relatively consistent and easily identified since the inception of the atomic age. In
a 1954 speech, for instance, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis Strauss
predicted this quixotic future; "Our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too
cheap to meter” (Stover, 1995, p.43).
The rhetoric associated with anti-nuclear power development efforts, on the other
hand, was uncommon in the early years of nuclear power development. This rhetoric is
typically viewed as emerging during the 1960s and 1970s, a time when movement rhetoric
became widespread in America. In actuality, anti-nuclear power rhetoric did begin
somewhat slowly. However, as we shall see, it did not begin during the 1960s or 1970s,
but nearly 20-years earlier at the dawn of the atomic age.
Nevertheless, many contemporary views still insist this rhetoric was not present in
the early years of nuclear power. In a 1989 study, Gamson and Modigliani pointed out
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that even during the early development of nuclear power there were, "cautious skeptics
who warned that the technological problems in tapping this energy source for human
betterment are formidable and far from solved. But no opposition to nuclear power
development is presented...In effect, there was no significant anti-nuclear power discourse
during this era." (p. 14)
The belief that anti-nuclear power rhetoric did not originate with the emergence of
nuclear power makes it a historically significant artifact for investigation. It is hoped that
such an investigation will demonstrate that anti-nuclear power development rhetoric, while
not as prevalent in the early years of nuclear power, did emerge at the dawn of the atomic
age to develop into a unique rhetoric.

PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to analyze the rhetoric surrounding the development
of commercial nuclear power. Specifically, the investigation will focus on rhetoric
associated with anti-nuclear power development viewpoints and efforts over a 34-year
period in the United States from 1945 to 1979. The intent of this study is to develop a
better understanding of the beginnings and constituents of the rhetoric associated with
anti-nuclear power viewpoints. A thorough investigation will demonstrate a unique
discourse that originated and evolved along with the development of nuclear power and
anti-nuclear power efforts.
This study will not focus specifically on elements of the anti-nuclear movement
(leadership, organization, life-cycle, etc.) and how that movement changed over three
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decades. Rather, this study will be a historical examination of the rhetorical progression of
discourse generate by anti-nuclear power efforts. As Riches and Sillars (1980) suggest,
"the longitudinal, comprehensive study of a social movement is the paradigmatic ideal.
These studies can provide fundamental insights into relationships between rhetoric and
history, between rhetoric and its predecessors, among competing rhetorics within a
movement, and among opposing rhetorics." (p. 281) Thus, the historical investigation is
evolutionary; it emphasizes rhetorical change over time.
The study of rhetoric using historical methods was pioneered by Leland M. Griffin.
In a 1952 essay he observed that a theory of the rhetoric of social movements can best be
generated when it is grounded in the history of movement rhetoric. It would, in fact, be
safe to assume that few theoretical arguments dealing with the rhetoric of social
movements have ignored history altogether. The quality of such arguments are likely
enhanced when supported by detailed historical case studies rather than a few selected
examples fi"om different moments in time.
Griffin's historical perspective suggests four possible approaches for the scholar
who might undertake historical investigation; 1) the period study, 2) the regional-period,
3) the case study, and 4) the movement study. In following Griffin's perspective, this
study is not intended to be an exercise in theory building and will not seek to develop or
advance a particular theory on anti-nuclear power rhetoric or movement. Rather, it will
follow a historical case study approach to explore opposition rhetoric associated with
nuclear power development from 1945 until 1979.
In discussing and elaborating on Griffin's essay. The Rhetoric of Historical
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Movements. Edwin Black (1965) observed, "For many purposes there can be no quarrel
with Griffin’s historically relative frame of reference... It is, then, to the rhetorical historian
that Griffin offers the greatest promise, "(p. 21)
Admittedly, historical examination and the construction o f theory cannot easily be
separated. However, as Andrews (1980) points out, historical inquiry is necessarily
atheoretical in a fundamental way. The rhetorical historian's independence of theory must
come through his or her willingness to examine the process of rhetorical influence without
preconceived theoretical notions of how that process must have worked in particular cases
(p. 275). This study is intended to follow Andrews' advice in adding to the existing body
of knowledge about anti-nuclear power rhetoric without necessarily being tied to a
preconceived theory.
In discussing history and theory in the study of social movements, Andrews also
(1980) pointed out that the exciting, and frustrating, characteristic of a movement is that it
moves, and what makes it move, in large measure, is the way language is manipulated to
control or interpret events;
In this sense, rhetoric makes moving possible - moving in all directions, pushing,
shoving, lurching forward and falling backward as the movement encounters its
environment. Growing out of the environment, intruding into the environment, the
social movement is simultaneously a rhetorical response and a rhetorical stimulus, (p.
274)
Likewise, it will be argued and demonstrated in this study, that a characteristic of
anti-nuclear power rhetoric is that it moves and progresses through time in a similar
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manner.
When commencing on a historical study, Andrews (1983) also insists that a
historical perspective virtually dictates that a scholar embark upon a study with as few
preconceived notions as possible. A historical study should yield a description and
explanation of unique patterns of rhetorical behavior and the relationship of those patterns
to the social environment in which they developed (p. 68). This investigation, when
possible, will avoid presumptions about the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear power movement.
For this historical investigation of anti-nuclear power rhetoric, rhetoric will be
rather broadly defined as the use of symbols to influence thought and action. Foss (1989)
found that "rhetoric is communication; it is simply an old term for what is now commonly
called communication - whenever we project a particular image to someone, attempt to
persuade someone to believe what we do, or are influenced by a painting or a film to look
at the world in a new way, we are involved in rhetoric." (p. 4) Therefore the rhetoric of
the anti-nuclear movement to be investigated during this case study includes speeches,
essays, excerpts from journals, newspaper and magazine articles and historical accounts of
the anti-nuclear movement.

JUSTMCATION
The rhetoric of the anti-nuclear movement deserves investigation. This effort is
justified by its potential contribution to our overall understanding of the historical behavior
of social movements and of rhetoric in general. As Hart (1976) points out, many historical
studies will be part of the slow, steady accumulation of confirming evidence for some
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large hypothesis, a journeyman's labors. Darsey (1991) found that the energy required
merely to characterize the data for these studies may force their authors to content
themselves with achieving accurate and precise description, a kind of rhetorical chapter to
a book someone else will edit.
In light of these ideas, the rhetoric of the anti-nuclear power movement in the
United States may be an especially useful case study for adding to the existing body of
knowledge on movement rhetoric. Furthermore, as a candidate for a case study, it has no
confusing predecessors, a well-defined point of origin, easily definable sections and an
abundance of documents containing rhetorical records.
In examining historical investigations, Lucas (1980) observed that among the kinds
of case studies that need to be undertaken, perhaps the foremost are ones that deal
exactingly, not just with some facet or another of movement rhetoric, but with the rhetoric
of individual movements from inception through culmination.
One advantage of such a thorough approach is that it compels the scholar to treat
the movement and its rhetoric as a temporal process, rather than as static or individual
periods. Another advantage is that it encourages the scholar to consider the full
complement of movement rhetoric, rather than to focus on a single set of addresses or the
discourse of a prominent leader in the movement.
A third advantage of the comprehensive historical approach is that it allows the
scholar to see the rhetoric of a social movement in its full complexity. Although individual
studies exist that deal with particular aspects of movement rhetoric, there is not a good
sense of the significance of those aspects together.
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Finally, justification for this case study is derived from the fact that social
movements have been major forces of change and resistance to change throughout
American history. Stewart (1983) regards this fact alone as justifying the study of social
movement rhetoric. However, the realization that social movements rely primarily upon
rhetoric to bring about or to resist change demands continued studies of social movement
rhetoric. Lucas (1980) remarked that imaginative and resourceful analysis of the
discourse of such historical moments would not only be valuable in its own right, but
could appreciably enrich our developing theoretical understanding of movement rhetoric in
general.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There are three areas of literature reviewed for the purposes of this study; 1)
studies focusing on historical investigations of social movements and rhetoric; 2) sources
which contain nuclear-power rhetoric or historical descriptions of the development of
nuclear power; and 3) studies on which the methodology of this case study will be based.
Since this investigation is primarily a historical case study of anti-nuclear power rhetoric,
the bulk of literary sources will be historical, rather than theoretical.
Historical Social Movements
Griffin's (1952) seminal essay The Rhetoric of Historical Movements, examines the
development of social movement rhetoric in historical terms. Griffin argues that a social
movement is a sustained process of social inference that "is dynamic, and has its
beginning, its progressions, and its terminations, so the rhetorical component of the
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movement is dynamic, and has its inception, its development, and its consummation" (p.
347).
Andrews (1980) points out that "in the thirty years since Griffin's essay was
published, the study of social movements by rhetorical scholars has become extensive and
serious." (p. 280) In examining history and theory in the study of rhetoric in social
movements, Andrews found that "by recognizing the distinctive nature of their scholarly
labors, rhetorical historians and rhetorical theorists can engage in research productive of a
deeper understanding of the rhetoric of social movements." (p. 281)
In discussing future areas of research in the area of social movements, Lucas
(1980) asserts that among the kinds of case studies that need to be undertaken, "perhaps
foremost are ones that deal exactingly, not just with some facet or another of movement
rhetoric, but with the rhetoric of individual movements from inception through
culmination." (p. 264)
The historical perspective in the study of social movements is further examined by
Andrews in a special issue of the Central States Speech Journal (1983). In providing
overview of the historical approach, Andrews found that historical investigation may lead
to a theoretical explanation to encompass the many rhetorical interactions inherent in
movements:
In the meantime, historical scholarship must continue to produce, untainted by
theoretical restraints, movement studies of depth and substance sufficient enough in
and of themselves to shed some light on the intricacies of social change, and complete
enough to provide meaningful insights to inform the theorists' always developing

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

13

conceptions, (p.69)
During the course of this study, additional sources will be utilized in order to gain
information concerning the historical study of social movements and movement rhetoric.
Of the published studies that focus on the rhetorical or historical aspects of social
movements, two have been particularly helpful in the development of this case study. One
article investigates the rhetoric surrounding nuclear power over a 40-year period as a
context for understanding the formation of public opinion on nuclear power (Gamson and
Modigliani, 1989). The other source (Darsey, 1991) is a similar historical study which
examines the rhetoric of gay liberation over a 13-year period. Both studies will be
explored in greater detail in a subsequent section of this literature review.
Historical and Rhetorical Material
The first category of literature provides an understanding of the development of
social movements or the development of the anti-nuclear power movement in the United
States. In this category, several texts have been particularly useful including. Persuasion
and Social Movements (Stewart, Smith, and Denton, 1994), Ideologv. Interest Group
Formation^ and the New Left (Cohen, 1988), Human Communication as Narration:
Toward a Philosophy of Reason. Value, and Action (Fisher, 1987), and Everything is
Changing: Contemporary U.S. Movements in Historical Perspective (DeLeon. 1988).
In addition to the texts, one article by Farrel and Goodnight (1981) was particular
helpful in researching rhetoric associated with nuclear power. Through a detailed
reconstruction of the discourse following the accident at Three Mile Island, the authors
concluded that, “the inadequacies of accidental rhetoric at Three Mile Island point to a
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failure larger than the technical breakdown of 1979: the failure of technical reason itself to
offer communication practices capable of mastering the problems of our age” (p.271).
As with many such case studies, additional historical and rhetorical information can
come from numerous sources which are admittedly pro or anti-nuclear power in tone.
This second category includes literature sources which are decidedly anti-nuclear in tone
but which are also a valuable source of historical and rhetorical information. An excellent
account of the development of nuclear power from an anti-nuclear perspective is given by
Berger (1976) in his book. Nuclear Power: The Unlivable Option. Berger details why
nuclear energy should be discarded for environmentally friendly alternative energy sources
such as wind and solar power.
In a similar book. The Menace of Atomic Energv. Nader and Abbotts (1977) delve
into much greater detail to demonstrate the technological and financial faults of nuclear
power. In examining the development of nuclear power, Nader, a self-proclaimed nemesis
of nuclear power, and Abbotts explore what they consider to be the intrinsic technical and
financial problems with nuclear power as well as sources of energy that could be used as
alternatives.
In No Nukes: everybody's guide to nuclear power, Gyorgy (1979) essentially
provides a primer on anti-nuclear movement in the United States. She explores the
historical development of nuclear weapons and nuclear power along with the development
of the anti-nuclear movement. Although Gyorgy focuses primarily on the overall antinuclear movement, she still provides some specific examples of anti-nuclear power
rhetoric and history. Likewise, The Anti-nuclear Movement, by Price (1982) examines the
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development of the anti-nuclear movement against the backdrop of nuclear weapons and
power development.
Additional sources of anti-nuclear power rhetoric and history include those
information materials, primers, and position papers distributed by groups opposed to
nuclear power development. Among this literature is information distributed by the Sierra
Club, John Birch Society, Ralph Nader's Critical Mass Project, Citizens Alert and Public
Citizen. Further information has been found in newspaper, magazine and journal articles
reporting on nuclear power.
A subsequent (third) category of literature examines the development of nuclear
power in more objective terms and investigates both pro and anti-nuclear power points of
view. Among these sources are Del Sesto's (1979) Science. Politics, and Controversy:
Civilian Nuclear Power in the United States. Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power by Falk (1982), and Decline and Fail: The Ailing Nuclear Power Industry by Stoler
(1985). Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste by Dunlap, Kraft and Rosa (1993) provides a
look at the public's reaction to the disposal of nuclear waste. As part of that examination,
the book provides an excellent and useful exploration of the public's reaction to the
development of nuclear power.
The fourth category presents literature which contains rhetoric and historical
information and is more pro-nuclear power in orientation. Grant (1988) provides an
effective and humorous case for the continued use of nuclear power in the United States in
Trashing Nuclear Power. He also examines and systematically debunks what he considers
to be the most pervasive anti-nuclear power myths in the United States.
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Cohen (1983) provides a more functional and pragmatic defense for the continued
use and development of nuclear power in Before It's Too Late: A Scientists Case For
Nuclear Energy He details several of the misimderstandings and myths associated with
nuclear power and attempts to familiarize the reader with the risks of nuclear energy as
opposed to other forms of energy.
Additional types of literature include numerous editions of Nuclear Industry.
(1995) a trade publication from the Nuclear Energy Institute, a public relations a lobbying
organization funded by the nuclear power industry. Additional Nuclear Energy Institute
information includes pamphlets, back-grounders, positions papers, and primers on the
development of nuclear power.
A similar organization, the U.S. Council For Energy Awareness, provided Nuclear
Energy: The First 50 Years (1992) as well as additional pamphlets and background
information on the benefits and development of nuclear power.
The final category of literature includes newspapers, magazine, and journal articles
taken from numerous national publications, including, in part, the New York Times. Los
Angglgs.Tim.gs, OKggnian, Sgattlg Post, Time Magazine. Newsweek. Smithsonian
Magazine, and New York Times Magazine.
Studies Used As Bases Of Methodology
In reviewing literature for this case study, two studies appear useful as the basis for
a methodology for the investigation of the development o f anti-nuclear rhetoric. In
examining the rhetoric surrounding nuclear power, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) writes,
"The Clamshell Alliance. The China Syndrome. Images of cooling towers at Three Mile
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Island. Chernobyl is everywhere. These are the nuggets from public discourse on nuclear
power that most of us instantly recognize " (p. I)
Their investigation traces the careers of interpretive packages on nuclear energy in
the media over a 40-year period and uses that information as a context for understanding
the formation of public opinion and the construction of meaning. They postulate that
nuclear power, like every other issue, has its own unique culture. Within that culture there
is an ongoing discourse that evolves over time, providing interpretations and meanings
about nuclear power events for the public. On issues such as nuclear power, there are also
competing interpretations, or packages, available within the culture. Interpretive
packages, or simply packages, represent a particular set o f feelings, beliefs or attitudes
about an issue.
Interpretive packages are not stagnant - they "ebb and flow in prominence and are
constantly revised and updated to accommodate new events." (Gamson and Modigliani,
1989, p.2) Thus, as new events combine with the experiences, opinions and
predispositions individuals use to construct meaning, packages evolve into new
interpretations of issues.
One such package which the authors named Progress is traced across a 40-year
period on television network news, major magazine accounts, editorial cartoons, and
syndicated columns. The Progress package represents early beliefs that nuclear power is
absolutely safe and frames the nuclear power issue in terms of society's commitment to
technological development and economic growth.
Gamson and Modigliani discovered that the Progress package evolved over time in

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

18

the media to represent more of a Devil's Bargain package. Devil's Bargain represents the
idea that nuclear power was cheap and mostly clean, but also inherently dangerous at the
same time. This evolution may have occurred when older Americans, who were used to
only the Progress package in the media, were exposed to different interpretive packages
(different beliefs and opinions of nuclear power) in the 1960s and 1970s, which
consequently led to opinions more reflective of the Devil's Bargain package.
In a study which also investigates the rhetoric of social movements in a historical
context, Darsey (1991) examines the rhetoric of gay liberation from 1977 through 1990.
Darsey developed a historical methodology that used catalytic events as markers of
rhetorical eras. Catalytic events are moments in the life of a movement that provide the
appropriate conditions for discourse. Such events (1) were historical rather than
rhetorical, (2) were non-tactical, (3) achieved tremendous significance for the movement,
and (4) precede rhetorical responses that constitute demonstrably discrete, internally
homogeneous rhetorical eras.
In this study and an earlier study that examines the rhetoric of the gay liberation
movement from its inception in 1948, Darsey identifies additional catalytic events and
rhetorical eras that correspond to periods in the gay liberation movement. His discussions
are based on a value analysis of selected samples of discourse with attention limited to the
five most frequently coded value appeals in each period.

METHODOLOGY
Foss (1989) observes that in some instances, the question the critic is asking and
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the nature of the artifact being analyzed require the development of method for answering
the question that does not rely on constructs, outlines, or theories developed by other
rhetorical scholars, (p. 18) Although this study will not seek to follow or advance any
specific critical theory, a novel method will be employed to examine three decades of antinuclear power rhetoric. This method will utilize a combination of two existing historical
methods utilized by Gamson and Modigliani and Darsey.
A combination of these two historical methods would, as Munshaw (1973)
explains, ofifer a helpful starting point for articulating relationships between time and
discourse. This amalgamation of methods will include identifying catalytic events in the
development (history) of nuclear power but not the identification of specific accompanying
rhetorical eras or corresponding value appeals as in Darsey's study. Rather, rhetorical
packages, similar to the Progress package identified by Gamson and Modigliani will be
identified as following each of the catalytic events in specific historical periods. Catalytic
events will be historical events in the development of nuclear power which resulted in antinuclear power rhetoric or achieved significance for anti-nuclear power efforts.
Gamson and Modigliani identified the progression of interpretive packages through
the investigation of media discourse as artifacts. Foss remarks that the artifact may be any
instance of symbol use that is of interest to the scholar and seems capable of generating
insights about rhetorical processes (p. 11).
This investigation will use numerous types of information as sources of rhetorical
artifacts. While earlier historical investigations concentrate primarily on media discourse,
this study will implement additional sources of information including historical
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publications, speeches, journals, congressional records and information literature provided
by both pro and anti-nuclear organizations. This investigation will not use rhetorical
artifacts from films, songs or personal interviews.
This investigation begins with the inception of the atomic age in 1945 and spans a
34-year period to the nuclear reactor accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. During the
examination of these three-decades, five distinctive catalytic events in the development of
nuclear power with corresponding historical periods will be investigated: 1) 1945 to
1952, 2) 1953 to 1962, 3) 1963 to 1972, 4) 1973 to 1978, and 5) 1979. This
sectioning of periods by catalytic event should provide useful entry points into 34-years of
nuclear power development and anti-nuclear power rhetoric.
Following a historical overview of each period a corresponding interpretive
package will be identified and named for each period. If such packages are identified, this
study also intends to explore how, and possibly why each package changed or remained
unchanged in different periods. Each catalytic event, historical period and corresponding
package will be introduced as a chapter within this thesis.
Period number one begins with a catalytic event which occurred on August 6,
1945 - the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japan - and continues until the year 1952.
Although it might be argued that the atomic age began with the first successful test of an
atomic weapon on July 16, 1945, public awareness of the atomic age did not began with
that test, but with the images of sudden and enormous destruction in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.
The second period essentially begins on December 8, 1953 with Dwight D.
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Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations and covers nearly a
decade until the year 1962. This period includes events which are often referred to as the
beginning o f the age of commercial nuclear power in the United States. In 1954, for
instance, the Atomic Energy Commission began a five-year reactor development program
with private power utilities. And the first contract for a nuclear power plant was signed in
the summer of 1956.
The third period continues with the year 1963 and the signing the Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, which ended all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons between the
United States and U.S.S.R. This period also spans nearly an entire decade until the year
1972.
The fourth period begins in 1973 with the Arab oil embargo of the United States
during the 1973 - 1974 Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel, and extends until the
year 1978. During this five-year period, the United States in an energy crises, rushes to
develop alternative sources of energy and diminish reliance on foreign crude oil. The
United States Government also begins to wrestle with the issues of promoting and
regulating an emerging nuclear power industry.
The fifth period begins, and essentially concludes in the year 1979 with what many
consider to be the watershed event in the opposition of nuclear power - the accident at the
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania nuclear power station on March 28. This period
examines events only during the year 1979 and is the completion of the 34-year period for
this case study.
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General Observations and Conclusion
"The detailing of key value appeals in the gay rights rhetoric for a thirteen-year
period...," writes Darsey (1991), "allows us to make some observations about changes in
this discourse over more than four decades."(p. 58) Similar observations and discussion
of anti-nuclear power rhetoric will be made available at the end of this case study, which
examines three decades and five periods of anti-nuclear power rhetoric in the United
States.
The case study methodology of examining anti-nuclear power rhetoric in terms of
the historical/catalytic events which led to its development should prove to be a very
useful and enlightening technique during this investigation. It is hoped that the case study
methodology will lead to the identification of unique interpretive packages in the
development of anti-nuclear power rhetoric from 1945 until 1979. Further this technique
should allow the examiner to draw several conclusions about how anti-nuclear power
rhetoric has changed or remained unchanged over the three decade period of examination.
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CHAPTER 2
Period One
Upon the earth the gods placed the first women. And to her was given the name
Pandora. On her life's walk she came upon a Box, which she was forbidden to open.
Pandora did not obey; fi'om her Box was cast forth all evil to this world. Within the
box only the legacy of hope remained.

"OBgk Mythology

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
On the morning of August 6, 1945, three B-29 Superfortress bombers flying at
31,000 feet passed over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Approximately half way across the
city, the lead bomber, Enola Gay released a single four-ton bomb nicknamed "Little Boy."
The captain of the Enola Gay, Lt. Col. Paul Tibbets, struggled to control his suddenly
lighter Superfortress as all three bombers immediately turned away from the center of the
city.
On the ground in Hiroshima, no civil defense alarms had sounded when the planes
appeared in the morning sky. A radio announcer on duty had received word that three
enemy planes had been sighted, but he had momentarily paused to check his notes instead
of grabbing the microphone. " 'Military command announces three enemy planes...' He
never finished. Outside, a teacher supervising a team of schoolgirl laborers said. Oh,
there's a b...' They looked up and saw the eye of death." (Gray, 1995, p.24)
"Little Boy," which had been dropped by the Enola Gay at 8:15 and 30 seconds in
the morning, detonated 43 seconds later at 1,900-feet above Hiroshima with
a reportedly greenish-white brilliance. Temperatures at the hypocenter, the point below
23
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the explosion, swelled to 7200 degrees Fahrenheit - within a mile of the blast the surfaces
of objects instantly rose to more than 1000 degrees Fahrenheit. A shockwave of super
heated air swept out from the hypocenter at 400 kilometers per hour. Nearly 20,000
people were killed instantly. A thick cloud of grey smoke and gas quickly covered the
city.
In the Enola Gay, Tibbets and his crew watched the blast. "A bright light filled the
plane." Tibbets later wrote in his journal. "We turned back to look at Hiroshima. The city
was hidden by that awful cloud...boiling up, mushrooming." (Thomas, 1995, p. 16) For a
moment, no one in the plane spoke - then everyone was talking. "Look at that! Look at
that! Look at that!' exclaimed co-pilot Robert Lewis pounding on Tibbets's shoulder.
Lewis said he could tasted atomic fission; it tasted like lead. Then he turned away to
write in his journal, 'My God, what have we done?"' (Thomas, 1995, p. 16)
At 1.2 kilometers from the hypocenter of the Hiroshima blast, people in the open
were instantly burned to death. At four kilometers the heat was 20-times more intense
than that from the sun, and exposed wood and skin blackened and peeled. Apart from the
blast, shock wave, and ensuing fire storm, there was ionizing radiation which is now
referred to as fallout. Approximately sixty percent of the city had been destroyed outright,
71,000 people had been killed, and another 68,000 injured. Three days later, an atomic
bomb nicknamed “Fat Man” was dropped on the city of Nagasaki with similar devastating
results. It appeared that science had opened Pandora's Box and unleashed its contents
onto an unsuspecting world.
The bombings were the culmination of the years-long, multi-billion dollar effort
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code named the Manhattan Project. Still, from a scientific perspective, they did not
exemplify a pivotal turning point in the search for control over natural forces in the
universe. All the science and technology employed in the bombings had previously been
discovered and demonstrated in a long history of experiments which dated back to the
early 1900s.
From a societal perspective, however, the bombings signified a critical turning
point in the way in which the public would discover the power of the atom. Up until the
atomic bombings, most nuclear developments had been shrouded in the cloak of wartime
secrecy. Nuclear reactors had actually been constructed and secretly used since the early
1940s (as part of the Manhattan Project) to create plutonium for the Trinity and Nagasaki
atomic bombs. Now the technology and science of the atom could no longer be kept
hidden from the public consciousness.
Technically, the atomic age dawned on July 16, 1945 with the first explosion of an
atomic bomb in New Mexico. However, Americans were unaware of the test, because the
Army released the following statement:
Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on
the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning. A remotely located ammunition
magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosives and pyrotechnics
exploded...Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast
may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their
homes. (Hilgartner, Bell & O'Connor, 1982, p. 34)
Consequently, public awareness of the atom's power did not begin with the New
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Mexico test or the "household" utilization of nuclear power, but with reports and images
of sudden nuclear destruction. For society, a nuclear genie o f sorts had been released
from its bottle and "its potent implications were laid bare for all to see." (Falk, 1982, p. 16)
According to Falk, News Chronicle reporter Robert Waitham captured the primary
reaction in the United States following the bombings:
In the newspapers and on the radio you read and hear today such passages as this:
'Yesterday we clinched the victory in the Pacific, but we sowed the whirlwind...With
such god-like power under man's imperfect control, we face a fiightfiil
responsibility. .We have narrowed down the choice to one of the end of war or the end
of humanity.' (p. 17)
Following the bombings, the Japanese government was forced to sue for peace
and to accept the United States' demand that it surrender unconditionally. Within two
months of the nuclear attacks, Japan had surrendered and the war in the Pacific had ended.
A new, nuclear era was beginning.
Many scientists who helped develop the weapons were dismayed at what their
research had yielded and sought only to find a way by which the nuclear genie could
somehow be recaptured and placed back into its bottle. But other, more pragmatic
scientists realized that once the genie had been released from bottle, it would be free upon
the world forever. Some scientists also reasoned that the atom's power was not
necessarily beyond the control of mankind. The energy of the atom, they proposed, might
be harnessed to power ships, planes, and electric generating plants, to heat and cool cities,
to run industries, and to make life better for mankind.
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Few of these "true believers" were more enthusiastic about atomic power than
Glenn Seaborg. As a Manhattan Project scientist, Seaborg had signed a secret report to
the Secretary o f War urging that the power of the atomic bomb be demonstrated to the
Japanese by dropping it on a barren island rather than on an inhabited city. Seaborg
believed that civilization's future was in the hands of the nuclear scientists, who might
possibly build a new world through nuclear technology. He envisioned a world of atomicpowered abundance and saw nuclear energy as a magic power that could free mankind
from any potential limitations.
Seaborg would, in fact, discuss at length the new science - predicting a future in
which millions of homes would be heated and lit by the power of a single nuclear reactor
and ships and planes could sail or fly almost forever on the energy contained in a pocketsized piece of plutonium. It would be a future in which the whole planet could be virtually
made over, mountain ranges leveled, deserts made to bloom and rivers controlled by the
forces that he and the other nuclear scientists had helped to put at man's disposal.
The possibilities at that point however, were still largely on the drawing board.
Because of the war, few of the scientists involved in nuclear research had given much
thought to the problems of designing nuclear power reactors or of turning their other
visions of cheap, abundant energy into reality. Nevertheless, following the war, a
majority in the scientific field shared Seaborg's idealistic vision of the possibilities of a
future dominated by nuclear power.
The result was a conspicuous body of rhetoric in the early atomic age which was
overly optimistic and bordering on science fiction in nature. "It was natural," wrote Jim
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Falk, "that politicians and members of the technical community most intimately connected
with the development of the nuclear bomb would be anxious to stress any positive benefits
that might stem fi’om it and to counter any criticism of their work." (p. 16)
Additionally, the extraordinary results of the scientist's work, and the swiftness in
which the atomic weapons were developed from theory to practice created a heightened
optimism in the ability of modem science to safely control the atomic genie. Even as
Hiroshima still burned from the atomic bombing. Secretary of War Stimson announced in
an August 6, 1945 press statement that atomic fission held;
great promise for sweeping developments by which our civilization may be enriched
when peace comes...With the evidence presently at hand...it appears inevitable that
many useful contributions to the well-being of mankind will ultimately flow from these
discoveries when the world situation makes it possible for science and industry to
concentrate on these aspects. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Conner, 1982, p.38)
Stimson and others in the government were not alone sharing their optimism with
the public. Many of the scientists and technicians involved in the development of the
atomic bombs publicly speculated about the potentiality of nuclear power. Archetypal of
these frequently fanciful speculations are the following excerpts from a 1945 edition of the
News Chronicle newspaper:
The horizon is now limitless, and questions which before were relegated to the realm
of fiction for the first time become practicable and even imminent. At the threshold of
boundless energy, man must reconsider his position in nature and his social relations.
(Falk, 1982, p. 18)
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Other speculations focused on the possible atomic exploration of space, predicting
that;
The old question of what lies on the other side of the moon may finally be
solved . These are questions which atomic energy driving rockets into space areas
hitherto veiled even to the telescope, may answer. (Falk, 1982, p. 18)
Most atomic power forecasts, however, focused on the seemingly unlimited applications
nuclear energy might have on earth:
This may well mean revolutionary changes in industrial power. If atomic energy can
be controlled as well as released, all other forms of power - coal, petrol, water power may become obsolete necessitating complete changes in the industrial pattern. This is
the key question: How long will it be before we can release the energy so that we can
guide it? (Falk, 1982, p. 18)
William L. Laurence, who became an enthusiastic promoter of atomic power,
wrote in a 1948 article in the Woman's Home Companion. "Today we are standing at a
major crossroads. One fork on the road has a signpost inscribed with the magic word
'Paradise'; the other fork also has a signpost bearing the word 'Doomsday.'" (Stoler, 1985,
p.33) Laurence trusted that humanity would find a way to avoid going down the path
marked "Doomsday." Using nuclear energy he argued, humanity had "a chance to enter a
new Eden,...abolishing disease and poverty, anxiety and fear"(Stoler, 1985, p.33).
Everything would get better and better; there would be better, finer and more
nourishing plants, better, cheaper, and more abundant fertilizer; better and richer soils,
farms, and gardens; better metals and machines; better and finer clothing and homes;
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better men and women. (Stoler, 1985, p.34) Summing up this "turning point in the history
of civilization," Lawrence claimed; "Such power plants could, in short, make the dream of
the earth as a Promised Land come true in time for many of us already bom to see and
enjoy it" (Stoler, 1985, p.34).
As pointed out be Daniel Ford, the widespread optimistic tone as to the boundless
benefits fi’om the power o f the atom were superbly summed up in a 1945 book titled
Atomic Energy in the Coming Era:
Planes carrying several thousand passengers, with as much cabin space as a luxury
finer will make non-stop flights fi’om New York to India or Australia ... Instead of
filling the gasoline tank of your automobile two or three times a week, you will travel
for a year on a pellet of atomic energy the size of a vitamin pill...
The same pill will be enough to heat your house for the winter ... The day is
gone when nations will fight for o il... No baseball game will be called off on account
of rain ... No airplane will by-pass an airport because o f fog. No city will experience a
winter of traffic jam because of heavy snow...
Universal and perpetual peace will reign in the Era of Atomic Energy for three
reasons... First: With energy as abundant as the air we breathe, there will be no longer
any reason to fight for oil or coal. Second: By using atomic energy to mine the ocean
for its vast mineral content, every nation will be able to obtain easily all the raw
materials that it needs. Third: With even more powerful atomic bombs than those
dropped on Japan, war will become so destructive that no nation will dare begin one...
Changes full as great as these will be ushered in with the widespread use of
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atomic energy. To begin with it will completely change the costs of production.
Cheaper cost of production will mean more plentiful production. It will also mean
new types of production. Processes now commercially impossible because of the cost
in electric power or heat would be too great will become possible at once. (p. 11)
In the midst of this enthusiastic environment, however, there were also those who
doubted the seemingly fantastic possibilities of the power of the atom. Toward the end of
the war, for instance, a Manhattan Project task force had been asked to develop a policy
on postwar nuclear research. Headed by R.C. Tolman, a dean at the California Institute of
Technology, the committee was not enthusiastic about the commercial applications of the
atom. Indeed, its report concluded: "The development of fission piles solely for the
production of power for ordinary commercial use does not appear economically sound nor
advisable fi-om the point of view of preserving national resources." (Ford, 1982, p. 24)
Overall, the committee felt that fissionable uranium was too valuable to use for generating
commercial electric power.
For a group of scientists who had become deeply concerned about the way
technical expertise had been applied to devastate Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there was an
additional concern: would the mass production of nuclear reactors inevitably lead to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons? To prevent such a proliferation, scientists like Leo
Szilard, a co discover of the chain reaction process that led to the development of the
atomic bomb, openly pressed for a moratorium on the further development of nuclear
energy. Although other scientists joined Szilard in voicing their concerns about the
development of nuclear power, most others in the scientific community considered a
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complete moratorium too high a price to pay for security against possible atomic attack.
For a different group of scientists, concern extended beyond the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. In particular, some believed that ionizing radiation presented a hazard
only partly understood and requiring investigation before any decision to commit to
nuclear power. In 1946, Dr. Herman Lisco warned in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
that the problem of radiation, "has not been discussed with the frankness that it requires."
(Falk, p. 92) Lisco's concern was a prophetic statement, but at the dawn of the atomic age
it was nearly a voice crying in the wilderness.
It was not only the scientists and economists who raised doubts about nuclear
power in the early years of the atomic age. There were also members of the public who,
at first, openly supported the development of nuclear power, only to subsequently become
anti-nuclear power activists. David Dellinger, an early pacifist and antiwar activist, said of
his decision to first support, then oppose nuclear power:
Now that the government was contemplating production of hydrogen bombs, a few
dozen activists gathered in Washington to try to help the country change its thinking.
We lobbied, held press briefings and public meetings, fasted for a week, and sat in the
Atomic Energy Commission's offices. We urged discontinuance of all development,
testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. We called instead for the peaceful uses
of atomic fission through development of nuclear energy.
In succumbing to the lure of nuclear power we were influenced by our belief in
the possibilities for human betterment through scientific discovery, and by our desire
to see the burdens of poverty lifted from the destitute and hard-pressed, as the early
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advocates of nuclear power announced they would be. Also, rather than only saying
no to something negative and diverse, we were eager to be able to say yes to
something positive and uniting. We wanted to remind ourselves and our opponents
that, as George Meredith once said. The things that separate us from our fellows are
as nothing compared to those that unite us with all humanity.'
These were honorable intentions. They remain central to the practice and
philosophy of the anti-nuclear, pro-renewable-energy movement today, though anyone
whose information is limited to the mass media might not realize it. But we should
have known better, even in 1948, than to believe what we were told about nuclear
energy, because we knew that the government had lied to us about the necessity for
dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To save thousands of American lives
that would have been lost in an inch-by-inch, mile-by-mile invasion of Japan, it had
been said, we had to destroy Japanese lives. What the government failed to mention
was that Japan had already sent out peace feelers, knowing that its military position
was hopeless. (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p. 234)
These dissenting views, no matter how partisan against the atom, never proved to
be more than the minority opinion during the dawning of the atomic age. The majority of
those in the scientific community and public realm continued to share Seaborg's quixotic
vision of the atom. For the majority who did not oppose the development of nuclear
power, the emerging atomic age would be a time when,
a very few individuals working a few hours a day at very easy tasks in the central
atomic power plant will provide all the heat, light and power required by a community
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and these utilities will be so cheap that their cost can hardly be reckoned. (Ford, p.30)
But even had scientists, economists and the public been completely united in their
enthusiasm for nuclear power, the path to the nuclear age of which they dreamed was
anything but unswerving. Congress and the Truman administration may, as did the
President himself, have wanted to make a blessing of nuclear power. But a number of
obstacles stood in the way of this goal, among them the emerging Cold War between the
United States and its former ally, the U.S.S.R.
Scientists also tended to sound as if they were writing science fiction when they
testified on the commercial applications of nuclear power. But military men tended to
sound as if they knew exactly what they were talking about when they discussed the
possible military applications of the atom.
So it was hardly surprising that Congress, in passing the Atomic Energy Act of
1946, stressed the possible military applications of the atom more than the potential
commercial uses. The Atomic Energy Act was designed for the primary purpose of
protecting atomic secrets so as to preserve America's monopoly on nuclear weapons and
technology. It was also intended to establish an Atomic Energy Commission to provide
civilian control over nuclear weaponry. As for the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the
United States, the 1946 act mentioned them only in passing.
The Atomic Energy Commission, which officially came into existence in August
1946, was almost instantly overwhelmed by its new responsibilities. For one thing, it
found itself with more people and facilities than it knew how to handle. It had inherited
fi’om the Manhattan Project a huge network of laboratories and manufacturing plants, not
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to mention more than 40,000 people. Deliberately scattered across the country, these
facilities had no central management. Nor did they have great deal of uranium.
The mine in the Belgian Congo that had provided the uranium for the "Trinity,"
"Little Boy" and "Fat Man" bombs was nearly exhausted. The reactors used during the
war for making plutonium were wearing out. The United States might have thought that
it had a stockpile of atomic bombs ready for use. But as David Lilienthal, the Atomic
Energy Commission's first chairman, reported to a rather stunned President Truman in the
spring of 1947, the cupboard was bare. The United States had no nuclear weapons
manufactured and ready for use. And it had very little uranium with which to make them.
But even before the development of the Soviet atomic bomb, the Atomic Energy
Commission had not been ready to proceed at top speed with the development of atomic
power reactors. A 1947 report by J. Robert Oppenheimer dampened some of the
commission's enthusiasm for nuclear power plants by arguing that a more realistic
evaluation of their prospects was necessary to balance popular misconception about them.
Oppenheimer said that it did not appear hopeful "to use natural uranium directly as an
adequate source of fuel for atomic power," and predicted that the development of
plutonium reactors capable of producing enough fuel for the utility industry would take
decades. (Ford, p.24)
Even Seaborg, ever the enthusiast where nuclear power was concerned, had to
concede that Oppenheimer was right. As a member of the commission's full advisory
committee, he concurred in a report in which the committee said that it did not see how it
would be possible "under the most favorable circumstances to have any considerable
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portion of the present power supply of the world replaced by nuclear fuel before the
exploration of twenty years." (Ford, p.24)
The fact that everyone - from Lilienthal and Seaborg to the people around the
President - had to face was that scientific enthusiasm for nuclear power plants had waned.
Most of the scientists involved with nuclear research were interested in studying the
properties of atoms, not in the nuts and bolts of power plant design, which they
considered "plumbing," and which they knew was not likely to win any of them Nobel
prizes.
Seaborg had gone back to Berkeley after the war to work on discovering more
new elements. Other scientists followed suit and returned to individual pursuits. The
Atomic Energy Commission, however, remained reluctant to write off nuclear power.
Leaders like Lilienthal feared that pulling the rug out from under public expectations might
play into the hands of those who thought of the atom as exclusively military property and
end civilian control of the commission. Lewis L. Strauss, who succeeded Lilienthal as
commissioner, felt that admitting that nuclear power was a pipe dream would handicap the
agency in the annual race for appropriations.
Understandably, the agency tried to have it both ways. It down-played nuclear
energy, but insisted that work on the atom's military applications would ultimately lead to
civilian applications, too. Its ploy was disingenuous. Bombs and reactors worked on
vastly different principles. Weapons research might lead to a better understanding of the
atom, which might prove valuable when researchers turned their attention to building
power reactors. But in no way could weapons research be considered the other side of
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the coin to developing power reactors.
Work on the peacetime applications of nuclear power was pushed even farther into
the background by work on the hydrogen bomb. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic
bomb, which ended the American nuclear monopoly, added additional fuel to the search
for a possible super weapon. The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the
scientists' plans to prooed with its development.
The outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 provided additional impetus.
Working at full speed, the Atomic Energy Commission and its scientists proceeded with
work on a thermonuclear device, exploding the first - the so-called "George Shot" - on the
Pacific island of Enewetok on May 8,1951. In the following years, the Atomic Energy
Commission followed this initial experiment with bigger and bigger thermonuclear devises.
The demonstration of what a hydrogen bomb could do horrified many Americans
and frightened many of America's allies. Many people quickly forgot the postwar dream
of the atom as the provider o f cheap, abundant power. Instead, they saw it only as an
agent of destruction (as they did initially at the end of the Second World War).
The prospect of the two postwar superpowers facing each other with hydrogen
bombs impressed large numbers of Americans with the need to rehabilitate the atom and
assure that its power would somehow be put to peaceful uses, not used to destroy cities in
a war that even then people realized no one would win. The government was ready to
explore the possibilities of the peaceful atom.
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PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
Interestingly, just as the test of the hydrogen bomb concludes the period from
1945 to 1952, it was the use of two atomic weapons which also initiated the period. As
perhaps the first catalytic event in the development of nuclear power, the dropping of two
atomic bombs on Japan in August of 1945, essentially signaled the beginning of the atomic
age in the United States.
After witnessing the destructive power of the bombs, it was natural that the
potential development of nuclear power was at once embraced as a "peaceful" atom which
would be harnessed to create a better standard of living for all mankind. The result was an
early body of rhetoric virtually declaring there would be no end to the possible uses of
nuclear power for mankind's betterment.
It was this idealized and frequently utopian view of an atomic-powered future
which led authors Gamson and Modigliani to designate Progress as the dominant
interpretive package during the early atomic age in the United States. In their 1989 study.
Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach, they
offered their description of the Progress package, which demonstrates the dominant
attitude toward nuclear power development:
If the electric chair had been invented before the electric light, would we still be using
kerosene lamps? There has always been resistance to technological progress by
nervous Nellies who see only the problems and ignore the benefits. Resistance to
nuclear energy development is the latest version of this irrational fear of progress and
change, the expression of modem pastoralists and nuclear Luddites. Certainly nuclear
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energy development is not free of problems, but problems can be solved, as the history
of technological progress shows. The failure to develop nuclear power will retard our
economic growth and make us renege on our obligation to the poor and to future
generations. If coercive Utopians prevent us from movang ahead now with nuclear
energy, the next generation is likely to be sitting around in the dark blaming the
utilities for not doing something this generation's officials would not let them do. (p.4)
Gamson and Modigliani also propose that a dualism about nuclear power
development is a the core of their Progress package. "We face the prospect either of
destruction on a scale which dwarfs anything thus far reported," said a New York Times
editorial a day after Hiroshima, "or of a golden era of social change which would satisfy
the most romantic utopian." (p.4) Accordingly, either civilization would vanish in a
cataclysmic nuclear holocaust, or the atomic future would be unimaginably bright (and
inexpensive).
The general message of their Progress package then, appears to be not how
quickly could America develop weapons of mass destruction. But how quickly could
America embrace the challenge of making the atom a benevolent servant to produce for
humankind "more comforts, more leisure, better health, more freedom and a much happier
life." (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 4)
With the scientific optimism and dualism at the nucleus of their Progress package,
the authors speculated that no substantial anti-nuclear power development rhetoric was
offered during the early atomic age in the United States, and that:
there were certainly cautious skeptics challenging the utopian claims. But this is a
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debate within a frame, a disagreement over how fast and how easily the promise of
nuclear energy will be realized. As long as the issue is framed as a choice between
atoms for war and atoms for peace, it is hard to see who could be against nuclear
power development, (p. 13)
The dualism at the core of anti-nuclear-power rhetoric, however, appears to
indicate otherwise. It indicates that the available rhetoric on nuclear power likely
represented two distinct viewpoints on nuclear power development, rather than a debate
within a single viewpoint.
For nuclear power development to be a non-issue, the Progress package would
have to have been basically unchallenged during the early atomic age. Yet scientists and
others, although clearly a minority at the time, did openly voice concerns about the
development of nuclear power, the dangers of the unknown effects of radiation and the
possible economic impacts.
It is possible, then, that two packages characterize nuclear power development
rhetoric in the early years of the atomic age. While the Progress package aptly provides
evidence of much of the enthusiastic early rhetoric associated with the development of
nuclear power, it does not completely accommodate and account for rhetoric which
clearly demonstrates resistance to the development of nuclear power.
The rhetoric which first openly questioned or opposed the development of nuclear
power was admittedly uncommon during the dawning of the atomic age. Nonetheless,
that rhetoric was present and can be characterized by its own package, referred to as
Pandora's Box for the Greek myth about the release of all evil onto the world by the first
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woman. The following passage, assembled from rhetorical vignettes from this period,
illustrates the sentimentality of the Pandora's Box package:
Through the release of atomic energy, our generation has brought into the world the
most revolutionary force since prehistoric man's discovery of fire. The splitting of the
atom has moved man into a new dimension. What began as a weapon against one's
enemies now may threaten the hand that wields it. This basic force of the universe
cannot be fitted into outmoded concepts...Radioactivity in the environment may be
irreversible. Once let out by man into the air, water or earth, it is here to stay, for the
lifetime of these radioactive substances can run into thousands and millions of years.
The problem of radiation has not been discussed with the frankness that it requires.
This first anti-nuclear power development package frames the development of
nuclear power in terms of a technology and energy source poorly understood at the dawn
of the atomic age. Pandora's Box reflects early viewpoints that something potentially
adverse had been released by science onto the world, although the exact nature of that
adversity was not completely understood by science or the public at the time. Those
inside and outside the scientific community who initially resisted nuclear power
development did so because it was a vastly unexplored technology with potential
radiological hazards and costs that had not been earnestly researched.
Furthermore this rhetorical package suggests that once science had released the
evils onto the world, they could not be returned to the box. Through its efforts, science
had released a nuclear evil of sorts onto the world. Mankind, whether they wanted to or
not, moved into a new age. The evil represented by nuclear weapons could not and would
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not ever be returned to Pandora’s Box. Consequently, it seemed unwise then to hastily
embrace and rush toward the development of another potential evil, nuclear power, and
free it upon the world forever as well.
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CHAPTER 3
Period Two

The private electric companies did not jump into nuclear power. They were kicked in.
—Sam Day, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
At the onset of the second period, spanning nearly a decade from 1953 to 1962, images of
the destructive power of nuclear weapons remained closely linked with efforts to develop nuclear
power. In the closing days o f the 1952 Presidential campaign, the United States conducted a test
of a new weapon, far more powerful than the atomic device that had leveled Hiroshima and
Nagasaki seven years earlier.
The awesome fireball that completely devoured a Pacific island a mile wide signaled the
birth of the hydrogen bomb. The almost unimaginable destructive power added a new dimension
to the arms race and left the American public looking for reassurance that the atom would be used
peacefully to the benefit of all mankind.
Newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower was prepared to provide that assurance to
Americans through the unveiling of his much awaited “Atoms for Peace” program. Speaking
before the United Nations General assembly on December 8, 1953, Eisenhower announced that
the United States was prepared to share the benefits of nuclear science and technology with the
rest of the world.
Eisenhower acknowledged that atomic energy had been, and could be used to
level entire cities and kill untold thousands. "But in a swords-into-plowshares approach borrowed
43
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from the Bible, he pledged to use the atom's power for peoples' benefit rather than destruction"
(Stoler, 1985, p. 28). Eisenhower also asserted that the benefits of the atom could be realized in
the present, that "the United States knows that the peaceful power from atomic energy is no
dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here - now, today. Nuclear power can
provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world" (Ford, 1984, p. 40).
Nuclear power, Eisenhower conceded in his address, could feasibly be misused in the era
of the peaceful atom. But, he insisted this abuse could also be prevented. "The U.S. pledges...to
help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by
which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to
his life" (Ford, p. 40).
Eisenhower's message before the United Nations Assembly virtually turned the phrase
"Atoms for Peace" into a slogan of nearly religious significance to the American public. “Atoms
for Peace” captured the hope that man kind would find a way to overcome the destructive
potential of nuclear energy and utilize the power of the atom to realize the dream of unlimited
material abundance.
More than just a description for an idealized future, however, “Atoms for Peace” also
marked the beginning of a significant shift in America's nuclear energy development policy.
Through his “Atoms for Peace” program, Eisenhower proposed the establishment of an
international atomic energy authority that would distribute fissionable material to member nations
and would:
devise methods whereby...fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful
pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs
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of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to
provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the
contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strengths to serve the needs
rather than the fears o f mankind.(Ford, p. 41)
Eisenhower's appeal and swords-into-plowshares approach of his proposal proved
to be more than effective. Reacting to President Eisenhower’s call to action, the
Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy drafted several new laws designed to
promote the peaceful applications o f nuclear power. The most significant of these new
laws was an amended version of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
The original act had strictly forbidden the private ownership of nuclear materials
and had kept most nuclear technology secret. The 1954 Act called upon the Atomic
Energy Commission to license private power utilities to build and operate nuclear power
stations in the United States. And, as almost an afterthought, the law also charged the
Atomic Energy Commission with the responsibility for protecting the health and safety of
the public.
Under the 1954 act, the Commission would be responsible for encouraging private
utilities to build and operate nuclear reactors across the country. The government would
retain ownership of all nuclear fuel, but permit its use in privately owned power stations.
The law also authorized the government to enter into bilateral agreements with other
countries for the peaceful development of atomic power stations, and liberalized patent
and secrecy provisions.
The 1954 Act also specifically prohibited the Atomic Energy Commission from
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selling electricity for profit and, in essence, becoming a power utility. What the law did
not forbid, though, was that the Atomic Energy Commission stop overseeing the
production of nuclear weapons. Thus, the Commission might help promote the use of
atoms for peace, but under the terms of the 1954 law, it continued to develop them for
war as well.
The Atomic Energy Commission wasted little time after the passage of the Act and
launched what Daniel Ford of the Union of Concerned Scientists described as "the most
ambitious construction program in the United States since the building of the railroads in
the 19th century" (Stoler, 1985, p.29). Ford's description was not hyperbole. The Atomic
Energy Commission projected that utilities would have 1000 nuclear power stations in
operation in the United States by the year 2000.
Even with this ambitious schedule in mind, the Atomic Energy Commission still
required an industrial partner to build the first commercial nuclear power station in the
United States. "It had little trouble finding one," wrote author Peter Stoler. (p. 36) The
Duquesne Light and Power Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania agreed to participate in
the venture and offered the Commission a site on the Ohio River at a location named
Shippingport. The commission accepted Duquesne's offer and the project went ahead.
The agreement between Duquesne Light and Power and the Commission
demonstrated how President Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” program had given renewed
hope to the possibility of a nuclear utopia. There would be nuclear powered planes, trains,
ships, and rockets; nuclear energy would genetically alter crops and preserve grains and
fish; nuclear reactors would generate cheap electricity.
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Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss captured the seemingly
unlimited potential of the atoms for peace vision in a speech to the National Association of
Science Writers in 1954:
Transmission of the elements - unlimited power, ability to investigate the working of
living cells by tracer atoms, the secret of photosynthesis about to be uncovered - these
and a host of other results all in 15 short years [from 1954]. It is not too much to
expect that our children will enjoy electrical energy too cheap to meter - will know of
great periodic regional famines only as matters of history - will travel effortlessly over
the seas and under them and through the air with a minimum o f danger and at great
speeds - and will experience a life span far longer than ours, as disease yields and man
comes to understand what causes him to age. This is the forecast for an age of peace.
(Hilgartner, Bell & O'Connor, 1982, p. 44)
With this utopian vision of the peaceful atom at its forefront, the age of
commercial nuclear power came into being on Labor Day in 1954. It began when
President Eisenhower appeared on national television from Denver, Colorado.
"Eisenhower," wrote Stoler, "was not one of the nation's greatest speakers; his tortured
syntax drove grammarians to distraction and journalists to bursts of parody. But the
former general had a keen sense of public relations and knew the value of a good
gesture"(Stoler, p. 16).
In his broadcast, Eisenhower made just one gesture. Waving a magic wand, he
signaled an unmanned, radio-controlled bulldozer to begin breaking ground at
Shippingport. As Stoler wrote. Life Magazine described the history-making scene;
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With a wave of a radioactive wand. President Eisenhower... transformed the bright
hope for atomic power peaceable used into a solid certainty...When the counter's
needle swung across the dial, it electrically set in motion, 1,300 miles away at
Shippingport, Pa. plant site, an automatically controlled power shovel which scooped
up the first symbolic shovelful of earth. (P. 141)
"Unfortunately, at the very same time - fi-om 1954 onward - serious problems
began cropping up ... bomb tests disclosed somatic, genetic, and environmental dangers
far worse than anyone had anticipated" (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 25). The potential
dangers of radiation, still not completely understood, were a troubling contradiction to the
vision of the peaceful atom. Fallout, a type of radiation known to the public because of
Hiroshima, became a public-relations problem that the Atomic Energy Commission was
never able to quiet after a March 1, 1954 nuclear bomb test. The explosion of the 15megaton hydrogen-bomb BRAVO had produced lethal levels of radioactive fallout over a
7,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, killing a crewman on a Japanese fishing boat and
heavily contaminating a group of American personnel. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor,
p.99)
The BRAVO story became a full fledged public-relations problem for the Atomic
Energy Commission on March 16, 1954, when Japanese newspapers reported that the
crew of the Japanese fishing boat had arrived in port suffering from radiation sickness
caused by grey, snow-like particles that fell on the boat after the March 1 test. The
captain said the boat had been well outside the danger zone established by the United
States, and that he received no warning before or after the test. And instead of using a
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ordinary word like fallout, the media referred to the phenomenon as "ashes of death,"
which served to heighten the public's growing apprehension o f radiation. (Hilgartner, Bell
& O’Connor, p.99)
The controversy and publicity over the BRAVO test intensified the public's
anxieties over the potential dangers of radiation and threatened to impede development of
the fledgling commercial nuclear industry. The vision of a benevolent atom was being
overshadowed by images of dangerous radioactive fallout, which ultimately resulted in
concerns about the potentiality of commercial reactor accidents involving large amounts of
radiation.
A single, 1,000-megawatt reactor could contain fission products equivalent to the
radiation produced by the radioactive decay of the 4 billion tons of naturally occurring
uranium contained in all the oceans of the world. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, p. 101)
The accidental release of even a small portion of the fission products of a single reactor
would be an unprecedented peacetime (and public relations) disaster for commercial
power.
The concern over radiation dangers resulted in a sluggish response toward nuclear
power plant ownership by the power industry in the United States. "The Atomic Energy
Commission," wrote Hogan, "found itself in the position of a puzzled hostess on the night
of her party who, hours having passed without a guest showing up, suddenly wonders if
she put the correct message on the invitations." (p. 26) It was true that planning nuclear
power projects would be time intensive, especially when most of the nuclear data was
classified and under the control of the military. Nevertheless, industry seemed to be
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shufiling its feet, waiting to see how the Government's pioneer reactor program with
Duquesne at Shippingport would do. Not a single application for a construction license
was received by the Commission.
The Atomic Energy Commission realized there was a need to provide further
incentives, and accordingly, in January 1955, the Commission armounced a "Power
Demonstration" program designed to stimulate plant construction." (Curtis & Hogan, p.
26) Liberal aid was offered to any utility prepared to construct a nuclear plant, in the form
of research and development assistance and waiver of fuel inventory charges for the first
five-years of plant operation. And finally, by March of that year, the first application was
received, followed by two more by the end of the year. In addition, two other projects,
privately financed rather than pushed by the demonstration program, were also launched.
Despite this seemingly forward motion, the power industry as a whole continued to
hesitate. It was becoming apparent to the Commission that the reason why many utilities
had supported the 1954 Act was to ward off a Federal Government threat to go into the
electricity business if private industry declined to take the nuclear initiative. Author
James W. Kuhn confirmed the utilities' position;
Under the threat of public power, several utility companies did come forth with plans
for large-scale nuclear power plants. Officers of the companies expected no profit
fi"om the plants. The incentive was largely negative - to keep civilian nuclear power
private. As the president of one of the companies remarked, "We acted because we
needed to guarantee the position of private industry. The money spent was a gamble
to preserve the private sector." The president of another of the companies explained
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why his management pushed into nuclear power; "We made a proposal on what
became Shippingport and we breathed a good deal easier when we didn't get the
contract. We weren't anxious to get into nuclear power, and I don't think any other
company in its right mind wanted to get into it either. But you see, we had to bid - we
had to act - whether we wanted to or not. We had been pushing the private
development of nuclear power and we couldn't refuse to get into it after pushing so
hard." (Kuhn, 1966, p. 114)
Industry lobbyists had managed to get a clause written into the 1954 Act
specifically forbidding the Government to engage in the sale or distribution of electricity
for commercial use. Now that the threat was averted, private utilities could take more
time to construct and operate nuclear plants. Or so the utilities thought. That clause had
a big loophole, however; It permitted the government to sell electricity incident to the
operation of research and development facilities o f the Commission. What was to prevent
the Government fi-om building numerous research and development facilities and selling
the incident electricity all over the United States? This was the Atomic Energy
Commission's major incentive for private utilities to go nuclear.
When the commercial power industry in 1956 continued to stall, taking just
enough incentive to keep the Government happy, and minimizing risks by forming large
joint-venture investor groups, the Commission announced the second round of the power
demonstration program. The second round contained additional subsidies and
construction of three more reactors began as a result. But still the industry hedged at
embracing the peaceful atom.
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Then, late in 1956 the Argone National Laboratory's experimental atomic reactor,
designed specifically for electricity generation, went into operation. The following year
Duquesne's Shippingport reactor was completed. The entire plant had been proposed,
designed and constructed in just three years. On December 2, 1957 - fifteen years after
the first nuclear chain reaction had been achieved at the University of Chicago - the
Shippingport reactor went critical for the first time, generating 60 megawatts of
electricity. (Stoler, 1985, p.37)
The power industry nodded appreciatively, but its attention was really fixed on the
units being erected solely by the private utilities, not those by the Government. The
former were proving more expensive to build than expected, and it looked as if they might
prove more expensive to operate as well. Financially, Shippingport's 60 megawatts did
not come as a bargain to the Government or Duquesne. The cost of producing electricity
with the plant was many times higher than the prevailing price of electrical power.
Technically, however, the plant proved to be a success. Its completion and
operation contributed enormously to the prestige of the Atomic Energy Commission's
Naval Reactors Branch. The plant also served as a feather in the cap of the government's
“Atoms for Peace” program and helped to establish a reactor design for the nuclear boom
that would eventually take hold in the early 1960s.
Publicly, however, the completion of the Shippingport plant still had to compete
with growing anxiety over radiation and the possibility of an accident at a commercial
reactor. There had been discussion at the 1955 Geneva conferences on atomic energy
about the probabilities and consequences of a major reactor accident, and a number of
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actual accidents at Government research reactors were beginning to make people question
nuclear power development.

The issue received widespread public attention with the publication of an Atomic
Energy Commission report early in 1957, which estimated that as many as 3400 fatalities,
43,000 injuries, and $7 billion in property damage could result from a commercial reactor
accident in the United States.
The study was undertaken by more than forty leading experts in the sciences and
engineering specialties from the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The report, along with
its estimates of likely death and destruction, also indicated that numerous questions about
nuclear energy remained unanswered;
The cumulative effects of radiation... is largely unknown. It will be clear that the
conclusions reached can be little more than educated guesses, since the direct effects
on humans of exposures of this character are largely unknown. Similarly, setting
definite limits on acceptable contamination levels for land...is risky... because of the
incomplete state of present knowledge. Comparatively little is known about the
problems involved in living in an environment heavily contaminated by radioactive
material.(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.p.58-59)
The Commission's report served to heighten doubts about the necessity of nuclear
power. Consequently, responding to fears over possible reactor accidents, the World
Federation for Mental Health commissioned a study of the mental health implications of
the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1957. The federation said that nuclear power might
arouse "many irrational fears, or irrational degrees of fear, because of the very special
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types of threats inherent in our popular concepts o f atomic energy ."(Hilgartner, Bell &
O’Connor, 1982, p. 102)
The federation warned that "the techniques o f the usual highly skilled public
relations divisions will not be adequate" to deal with these new problems. What was
needed were "the technical skills of specially experienced personnel... who are trained in
the interpretation of deep-seated types of reaction in individuals, groups and populations."
These people could use their knowledge of personality dynamics" to handle "irrational
attitudes" and build "positive moral" about nuclear power. (Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor,
1982, p. 102)
The World Health Organization responded to the federation's plea in the fall of
1957, convening the Study Group on Mental Health Aspects of the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy. In describing its mission, the study group concluded that "the behavioral
sciences can make a valuable and concrete contribution to the adaptation of mankind to
the advent of atomic power, making it indeed as painless and as unharmful as possible and
allowing man to reap a rich harvest from the seed his inventive genius has sown."
(Hilgartner, Bell & O’Connor, 1982, p. 102) Thus it was no surprise that the group was
alarmed by the public's "irrational fear" of nuclear power. According to Hilgartner, Bell
and O’Connor, these irrational fears were not supported by present knowledge:
When the evidence of abnormal emotional response to atomic energy is checked
against reality it is clear that the response is quite unjustified, in terms both of quantity
and quality. The balanced conclusion of a review of present knowledge would be that,
even if all the objective evidence were interpreted in the most pessimistic way possible.
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the weight of evidence would not justify anxiety in the present, and only vaguely and
remotely in the future. Yet anxiety exists and persists to a quite extraordinary degree.
This can only be accounted for by looking into the psychological nature of man
himself, (p. 102)
Even with this public-relations approach in hand, utilities still questioned whether
the public would generally agree to nuclear power stations in their communities and
whether the costs of building safe reactors made nuclear power unfeasible. It appeared
that the cost of insurance alone could price reactors out of the market, and if not, who
would pay for the claims in the event of a nuclear plant accident?
The insurance industry, on the other hand, was not even certain of how, or even if,
the emerging nuclear industry should be insured. The beliefs of the insurance industry
were well expressed in 1956 by Hubert W. Yount, vice-president of Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company. After considering possible consequences of a major nuclear plant
accident, Yount was forced to declare to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy:
The hazard is new. It differs from anything which our industry has previously been
called upon to insure. Its potential is still unknown and must therefore be calculated
currently in terms of a body of knowledge which is expanding from day to day... We
have heard estimates of catastrophe potential under the worst possible circumstances
running not merely into millions or tens of millions but into hundreds of millions and
billions of dollars. It is a reasonable question of public policy as to whether a hazard
of this magnitude should be permitted, if it actually exists. Obviously there is no
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principle of insurance that can be applied to a single location where the potential loss
approaches such astronomical proportions. Even i f insurance could be found, there is
a serious question whether the amount o f damage to persons and property would be
worth the possible benefit accruingfrom atomic fsfeve/ppwew/. [emphasis added]
(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 194)
Thus it appeared that the insurance industry was questioning whether it was
beneficial to even develop nuclear power at that time. And until questions of safety and
liability could be answered for utilities, no major investment capital was going to be put
into nuclear power. "Accordingly," wrote Curtis and Hogan, "our Government held out
the biggest carrot yet." (p. 28)
In 1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson amendments to the Atomic Energy
Act. The amendments were important to nuclear power development. They imposed a
ceiling on the liability of any nuclear power licensee in the event of an accident at a nuclear
plant. It was a ceiling that was far lower than the likely costs of such an accident. The
amendments established a $560 million fund to which the Atomic Energy Commission and
private insurers were to contribute. It specified that once the $560 million was distributed,
there was no further liability.(Stoler, p. 37)
Bitterly attacked by critics of the industry, the Price-Anderson amendments
removed a major obstacle to the private development of nuclear power. With the obstacle
removed, electric utilities began to apply for licenses to build and operate their own
reactors. In late 1957 the Atomic Energy Commission issued additional construction
permits for two commercial nuclear reactors. One went to Commonwealth Edison of
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Illinois to build a 200-megawatt reactor near Morris, Illinois. The other went to New
York's Consolidated Edison Company so that it could begin construction of a 265megawatt pressurized water reactor at Buchanen, New York.
Although plants were being constructed, development was still not moving at the
pace the Atomic Energy Commission had envisioned years earlier. The Commission may
have been demonstrating power, but it was not demonstrating its ability to get American
utilities to embrace the peaceful atom. A crises began to loom, and after President John
F. Kennedy took office he requested a thorough assessment of the past, present, and
future of atomic energy from the Commission.
Curtis and Hogan wrote that the Commission’s response was a 1962 Report to the
President on Civilian Nuclear Power, which was a major policy statement. Because the
future of nuclear power was at stake, the report was carefully worded. How, for instance,
would the commission explain the lackluster response to nuclear energy by the utilities?
This passage from the report answered that question:
Nuclear electric power has been shown to be technically feasible, indeed, readily
achieved. Power reactors can be reliably and safely operated. However, contrary to
earlier optimism, the economic requirements have led to many problems - combining
low capital cost with long life and assured reliability; lowering costs by improved
efficiency; developing long-lived and, therefore, economic fuels. Attempts to optimize
the economics by working on the outer fringes of technical experience, together with
the difficulties always experienced in a new and rapidly advancing technology, have led
to many disappointments and frustrations. Experiments have not always worked as
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planned. Many construction projects have experienced delays and financial overruns.
Such diflSculties led to considerable diminution of the earlier optimism regarding the
early utilization of nuclear power, which in turn contributed to the withdrawal of some
equipment and component manufacturers fi-om the field. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969,
p. 196)
The meaning and implications of the report's findings were clear: the development
of nuclear reactors at that stage could not be made both technically feasible and
economical. If the government wanted safe, reliable reactors under present technology, it
would have to build and operate them at a loss. If the government wanted economically
competitive reactors, it would have to compromise safeguards.
Such profound revelations, however, carried little weight against an extremely
determined Atomic Energy Commission and nuclear power development moved forward
with the construction of additional plants. And soon, utilities were not the only companies
becoming interested in the possibilities of nuclear power. In July 1959, the first American
nuclear-powered ship, the Savannah, was launched at Camden, New Jersey. Just over a
year later, in November 1960, the first U.S.-designed nuclear reactor was started up
overseas. Built by General Electric, the 16-megawatt reactor at Kahl, West Germany, was
merely a demonstration project. But it was a successful one, and it helped to sell U.S.
nuclear technology abroad.
The late 1950s and early 1960s also witnessed the emergence of resistance to
nuclear power based on potential dangers involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes. Dr.
Wallace De Laguna of Oak Ridge National Laboratory argued in a 1959 Bulletin of the
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Atomic_Scientists article that when discussing what is safe waste disposal, the nature of
the hazard must be explained if the public is to appreciate and ensure the enforcement of
the peculiar precautions required. "But," Laguna worried, "the wastes may then be seen
as a 'terrifying menace' which may lead us into unwise action."(p. 35)
Most people then involved with nuclear developments had yet to acknowledge that
any serious problems accompanied the nuclear fuel cycle. Any reference was usually to
the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation or testing. "Nevertheless," according to
Falk in Global Fission, "by the end of the 1950s, a few scientists had emerged who were
sufficiently concerned about the hazards associated with local nuclear activities to begin
public agitation."(1982, p. 93)
In September of 1959, a letter to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists illustrated
the start of what would be a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission
from dumping radioactive wastes in the sea off the coast of Massachusetts;
We are members of the Lower Cape Committee on Radioactive Waste Disposal which
has been protesting proposed atomic waste dumps in Massachusetts waters. With the
cessation of nuclear weapons tests - a cessation we hope will continue - we believe the
disposal of radioactive wastes will become the 'number one' radiation problem of the
nuclear age. Greater attention must be given to its hazards and their proper control.
(p. 123)
The letter referred to twenty-eight dump sites and added that strong opposition is
expected from the coastal areas of Massachusetts. More significant was the way the
authors described themselves. "We are," they said, "writing in our capacity as citizens and
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scientists."(p. 123)
The debate remained restricted to the technical community involved in nuclear
developments until construction on more commercial reactors began and the issue became
known to others in communities. "Yet it would be necessary for some scientists to both
draw attention to the technical unknowns and translate their implications into language
understandable by the public. "(Falk, p. 94)
Many of the first to question nuclear plans as a group were life scientists biologists and ecologists. This was partly because they were much less personally
involved in the development of nuclear power, but also because they were aware that the
state of knowledge on the effects of radiation was still rudimentary. They were therefore
less inclined to the technical optimism of their colleagues in the physical sciences.
A few early actions against nuclear power, in fact, occurred at the beginning of the
1960s. In 1962 David Pesonen, a forest ecologist, founded a group of citizens to try to
stop the construction of a 325 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bogeda Head just north of San
Francisco, California. In the autumn of 1963 the group released 1000 colored balloons at
the reactor site to show how wind would carry radioactive strontium and iodine.(Falk, p.
94)
Nonetheless, elsewhere around the United States, nuclear power seemed to be
catching on quickly. Plants, most of them built by either Westinghouse or General
Electric, began to sprout up around the country like mushrooms after a rain. By the end
of 1962, five privately owned reactors were in operation around the United States,
generating a total of just under 800 megawatts of electricity. The age of full-scale

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

61

commercial nuclear power development was about to begin.
Still, there were those who remained steadfast in their beliefs about the
development o f nuclear power. Representative John P. Saylor of Pennsylvania, speaking
before Congress in 1963, recalled the deep misgivings he and many other colleagues felt
about the relative surge forward in commercial nuclear power;
It was not too many years ago, Mr Speaker, that the general public was excited at the
prospect of the development of an atomic reactor which purportedly would bring vast
cost savings to consumers of electric power. It is true that a number of Members of
Congress had serious doubts about the practibility of using millions upon millions of
dollars of U.S. Treasury funds merely to utilize a new source of energy for power
generation. I recall that many of us stood on the floor of this House time and again as
far back as 1956 to question the wisdom of such tremendous expenditures, particularly
when the U.S. Geological Survey has established without qualification the existence of
sufficient coal reserves to satisfy the power requirements of the entire nations for at
least a century to come. Congress also was reminded of warnings by distinguished
scientists who believed that the safety issues entwined in the fission process should be
resolved before the wholesale construction of nuclear facilities. (Curtis & Hogan, p.
24-25)
And in another passage from Saylor's speech;
In other words, Mr. Speaker, although at least 1.3 billion dollars has been poured into
the civilian reactor program by the Atomic Energy Commission in the past nine years,
the imbalance of costs between electricity generated by the atom and that generated by
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conventional fuels is still of such magnitude that even the current multi-million-dollar
bestowals by the Federal Government to the investor-owned utilities may have to be
increased in order to get the program moving at the rate desired by the Atomic Energy
Commission. Meanwhile, irrespective of the expensive research carried out since
1954, the degree of danger hovering over a nuclear power plant remains a mystery.
(Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.32)
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
The preceding passages from Congressman Saylor's speech are representative of
the concerns and resistance to nuclear power development which began to surface during
the period covering 1953 to 1962. During this period, the government responded to
President Eisenhower's call to arms under the Atoms for Peace program to find more
beneficial and benign uses for the atom. Consequently, the government launched a
determined program to demonstrate the viability of commercial atomic power and provide
incentives for private utilities to go nuclear.
Rhetoric associated with resistance to the development of nuclear power in the
first period of this study, 1945 - 1952, was characterized by an interpretative package
called Pandora's Box. Briefly revisited. Pandora's Box represented early beliefs that
science had essentially opened Pandora's Box and released its evils upon the world. From
the viewpoint of those early nuclear power development dissenters, something adverse had
been released by science onto the world, although the exact nature of that adversity was
not completely understood at the time.
The nine-years encompassing period two witnessed a steadily improving
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understanding of the potential dangers of radiation. Again, the growing realization of the
dangers of radiation was due to the close link between the development of nuclear power
and nuclear weapons. When Japan was bombed, there was little or no understanding of
what the resulting radiation would do. Radiation sickness was seen for the first time after
the bombings when the United States established a commission to study the long-term
efiects of the bombings. Furthermore, testing in the Pacific in 1954 had resulted in large
amounts of highly publicized radioactive fallout which caused numerous injuries and
fatalities.
Added to the increasing knowledge of radiation dangers, was a growing awareness
that nuclear power was not as economically competitive as first contemplated. A joint
venture between the government and Duquesne Light and Power had resulted in the
completion of the first commercial reactor in 1957 at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
However, the cost involved in producing electricity with this plant turned out to be much
more expensive than burning fossil fuels. In addition, utilities, insurance companies and
the government struggled with the question of how the commercial nuclear industry could
be insured and still be economically viable.
The government's response to growing concerns over radiation hazards and the
economic hurdles of nuclear power was to offer private power utilities vast incentives to
become nuclear utilities. The most potent of these incentives was the fact that the
government could sell electricity it produced with "research" reactors, and therefore
compete against private utilities.
Consequently, efforts and rhetoric opposing nuclear power development during
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this period largely centered on possible radiation hazards, economic difficulties and
government programs which drove utilities toward commercial atomic power. Thus,
Pandora's Box, based upon an incomplete understanding of radiation and economic
hazards, did not remain the dominant interpretive package of opposition rhetoric during
the second period.
The dominant interpretative package of opposition rhetoric offered during this
period can best be referred to as Mirage. Consider the following description of nuclear
power development attitudes and opinions contained within

Mirage package:

The splitting of the atom has inspired mankind with a vision of grandeur, a vision of a
world whose peaceful needs are served by a deadly force rendered tame by men of
wisdom and good will. Electricity will be too cheap to meter and no material wealth
will be unattainable. However, it is important for mankind to reflect seriously upon
the significance of his enterprises, to assess possible ways in which temporary
advantages are secured only at the intolerable cost of long-range liabilities. Nothing
better illustrates this truth than the contrast between the potential catastrophic
consequences of atomic power and its ephemeral, even illusory benefits. One nuclear
reactor accident alone can create havoc equivalent to innumerable conventional
disasters, plus the fact that even if no major accident occurs, the cumulative problems
and financial expenses will burden future generations with a cross of staggering weight
- these facts point to the conclusion that continued effort to develop a safe atomic
power program is not worth the risk to humanity.
This package, constructed of vignettes from opposition rhetoric from this period.
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frames nuclear power development as an energy source which was beginning to look a
little more like fantasy than fact. In a sense, the realities of nuclear power development
were beginning to separate from the overly optimistic and imaginative predictions about
nuclear power found at the onset of the atomic age.
In the early years, nuclear power was seen only through the rose-colored glasses of
technological advancement, material wealth and the antithesis of the destructive atom
(bomb). But a growing knowledge of radiation dangers combined with immense costs and
a Governmental program to drive utilities toward the atom, was providing evidence that
nuclear power was likely more of a bust than technical and economic bounty. As such, the
dominant interperative package of antinuclear power development rhetoric. Mirage
reflected that nuclear power was beginning to look more like an illusion
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CHAPTER 4
Period Three
By 1967, we had become thoroughly convinced that the entire approach to the handling of
public health and safety aspects of nuclear energy development was erroneous.
—Gofinan & Tamblin. Population Control
Through Nuclear Pollution

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
During the nine-years comprising period three, 1963 to 1972, challenges to the
development of nuclear power continued, fueled by concerns over the economic and
safety aspects of nuclear power. The public, joined by members o f the scientific
community, began to form into more cohesive groups vocally opposing first nuclear
weapons testing, and then the development of nuclear power. Concerns about fallout and
the dangers of radiation continued to grow, fueled primarily by the above-ground testing
of nuclear weapons.
In August, 1963, President John F. Kennedy joined Great Britain and the Soviet
Union in signing the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which ended atmospheric testing of
nuclear weapons. Following the signing of the treaty, the main radiation fallout danger
would come from French and later Chinese atmospheric testing and from unplanned
releases of radiation from underground testing.
The signing of the Test Ban Treaty also meant that many groups opposed to
atmospheric testing had accomplished their goals. "In the early sixties," wrote Harvey
Wasserman and Norman Solomon, "as the test ban treaty took hold, scientists who had
devoted long years to fighting for it went back to their laboratories with a sense of
66
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of pollution of the earth." (Wasserman & Solomon, p. 436) In 1969, Gofinan and Tamblin
urged a tenfold reduction in the Atomic Energy Commission's maximum permissible
radiation dosed to the general public from nuclear reactors.
The recommendation stunned backers of the peaceful atom. Gofman's and
Tamblin's findings carried enormous weight; they resulted from six years of work by men
recognized as experts in their field, conducting a major study initiated by the Atomic
Energy Commission. Before 1969 only a handful of scientists had considered the issue of
leaking reactors.
For the most part, the scientific community and the public had been assured that
reactor leakage would be virtually nonexistent, and at any rate would pose no serious
health threat. Now Gofinan and Tamblin were saying otherwise. At a major symposium
in San Francisco in October of 1969, they warned that emissions from commercial power
plants considered acceptable could in fact harm large numbers of people:
If the average exposure of the U.S. population were to reach the allowable 0.17 rads
per year average there would in time be an excess of 32,000 cases of fatal cancer plus
leukemia per year. And deaths will occur year after year. (Wasserman & Norman, p.
438)
Thus, the growth of nuclear energy opposition during this period was due partly to
the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, and a shift away from nuclear weapons testing
opposition. It was also due to the findings of Gofinan and Tamblin and other scientists
who had, during this period gained a comprehensive understanding of the potential
dangers of radiation to humans and the environment.
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No matter how compelling the scientific findings, however, scientists like Gofinan
and Tamblin were practically standing in the path of runaway locomotive during this
period. The early 1960s marked the beginning of what some historians have called the
Great Bandwagon Market for nuclear energy. (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p. 20) Essentially,
this period was a gold rush to produce nuclear energy electricity.
The construction and operation of the Shippingport reactor in the late 1950s was
cited as proof that safe, economical nuclear energy was at hand. In 1963, Jersey Central
Power and Light Company contracted for the purchase of a 515-megawatt reactor to be
built in Oyster Creek, New Jersey. It would be the first plant to generate electricity
without benefit of federal subsidy. In addition the contractor. General Electric, had
offered to build the plant at a fixed cost, which would change only in accordance with
inflation over the construction period. Accordingly, the utility cited the construction of its
plant as evidence that the age of commercially competitive nuclear power had dawned.
"The dawn, however, was a false one," wrote Peter Stoler, "and both General
Electric and Jersey Central Power knew it." (1985, p. 41) The company could claim
economic viability because it had not borne the full cost of building the Oyster Creek
plant. The major share of the cost of building the plant had been borne by General
Electric. The giant manufacturer, which made everything from power plants to toasters,
had built Oyster Creek for $91 million on a "turnkey contract." (Stoler, p. 41) This was in
essence a bargain-basement package deal covering equipment and construction, which the
company made so economically attractive that practically no American utility could turn it
down.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

70

The reason for such an approach was simple. The Atomic Energy Commission
and its contractor companies had made a major investment in developing reactor
technology. In the five years preceding Oyster Creek's construction, the Commission had
spent approximately $ 1.2 billion; private companies, including General Electric, had
invested about half that amount. Now the companies, at least, wanted to get their money
back. Thirty or so reactor designs had been investigated by the Atomic Energy
Commission, but only two had been found to be really workable. The Commission had
endorsed the two designs, and companies wanted to make certain that their products
became the industry standards.
For both General Electric and competitor Westinghouse, the opportunity to do so
could not have come at a better time. The early sixties had been a slow period for both
companies. By 1964, the year that Oyster Creek was actually ordered, sales at
Westinghouse had remained the same since 1957 and General Electric had barely
increased its sales during the same period. Morale at both companies was falling lower
and lower.
For both, moral and sales quickly improved. In 1963 both companies got new
management. Fred Borch took over as chief executive at General Electric. Donald
Burnham, a veteran financial executive, took over the helm at Westinghouse. (Stoler, p.
39)
Both men were believers in the vision of the peaceful atom and neither lost any
time getting his company involved in nuclear power. Borch decided to revitalize General
Electric by putting the company's substantial resources into a series of high-risk ventures.
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all designed to appeal to the popular imagination - aerospace, computers, and nuclear
power. Burnham also decided to build Westinghouse's profits by branching out from the
firm's traditional line of products - including nuclear power. Taking advantage of the leg
up the company had gained by working with the Navy on the Nautilus submarine and
Shippingport reactors, Burnham envisioned Westinghouse dominating the reactor market.
The competition between the companies was soon at a fever pitch. General
Electric Engineers worked at full speed to design plants that were not only economically
competitive with fbssil-fliel plants, but so much cheaper that no utility could afford to pass
them up. Westinghouse was just as determined to stay in the race.
Convinced that costs would drop as the experience of building nuclear plants
accumulated. General Electric decided to win widespread acceptance of its reactor design
by taking all risks involved in their construction. And this was why the company offered
to build Oyster Creek at an irresistible price. Westinghouse, not to be outdone, offered
similar packages and, in an effort to get ahead, accelerated the development of even larger
reactors.
American utilities, which had initially been slow to adopt the new technology,
quickly found themselves convinced by the optimistic cost projections put out by
Westinghouse and General Electric. By mid-1965 "the Great Bandwagon Market for
nuclear energy was in full swing." (Kaku & Trainer, p. 20) Between 1965 and 1967
utilities placed orders for fifty nuclear power stations totaling 40,000 megawatts of
electrical generating capacity.
It was also apparent that by the mid-1960s. General Electric was clearly ahead in
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the race for domination of the nuclear power field. The first company to publish an actual
price list. General Electric also moved ahead of Westinghouse in increasing the sizes of
plants. Following a period in which the largest plant built had generated a mere 200
megawatts. General Electric had forced the pace of the race by building Oyster Creek at
650 megawatts. A year later, keeping up with the increasing size of coal-fired plants.
General Electric offered buyers an 800-megawatt model, followed a year later by an even
larger plant, an 1,100-megawatt plant.
But what really put General Electric ahead in the race was the coup it scored in
1966 when it sold a reactor to the nation's largest producer of electricity, the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). Located right in the heart of some of the nation's most
productive coal country, the publicly owned TVA generated most of its power by either
burning the locally mined coal or by harnessing the power of major rivers. It had no real
need to go nuclear, but decided to do so to enhance its image as a progressive, forwardlooking operation. It did not, however, intend to go nuclear at a premium. Proud of its
record of providing a great deal of power at low cost, the TVA made it clear that anyone
who sold it a reactor would have to sell it cheaply.
Both General Electric and Westinghouse were interested in selling reactors to the
TVA, but General Electric won out over its competitor. General Electric offered the TVA
a fixed price for two 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactors to be built at Browns Ferry,
Alabama.
The news media hailed the Authority's decision to go nuclear as the start of a new
era of electric generation in the United States. But the media were not alone in their
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enthusiasm. "Utility companies and their executives," wrote Stoler, "joined in the chorus,
predicting that costs would actually come down with the building o f each successive
nuclear power plant and forecasting that the price of uranium would also drop as the
construction of more and more plants created a major market for the nuclear fuel" (p.44).
There seemed at the time to be at least some basis for this prediction. In 1964,
President Lyndon Johnson signed an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act that provided
for the eventual private ownership of nuclear fuel. Prior to the passage of the amendment,
the government had owned all nuclear fuel and leased it to the industry. The amendment
allowed the utilities to buy and own uranium for their nuclear plants.
But neither the Tennessee Valley Authority contract nor the amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act, which was actually put into effect in 1969, were enough to convince
one dissenter. Philip Spom, a former chief of the huge American Electric Power
Company, had never been convinced by the zealots that nuclear power was economical.
In 1967 he aired his suspicions by producing a detailed analysis of the General Electric bid
for Oyster Creek. (Price, 1982, p. 9)
His analysis showed convincingly that the claim that cost-competitive nuclear
power had arrived was premature to say the least. Noting the competition between the
two reactor building companies, he dismissed the nuclear boom of the mid-sixties as "The
Great Bandwagon Market," citing the fact that when the Valley Authority sought bids for
a third plant. General Electric's bargain price was no longer available. "Clearly," said
Spom, "the General Electric bid on Browns Ferry had been a come-on, and a successful
one at that" (Stoler, 1985, p.44).
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Spom's study impacted the adolescent nuclear industry. As former chief of the
world's largest privately owned utility with a reputation for running his company
efficiently, Spom would not be suspected of a knee-jerk opposition to nuclear power. Nor
could Spom's three main points be ignored. They were that the utility industry and the
government had become so engrossed in their enthusiasm for the peaceful atom that they
had forgotten that the costs of conventional fuels were decreasing, that the costs of
building nuclear plants were approximately 15 percent higher than those estimated by
utilities, and that the costs of producing electricity with those plants was 20 percent higher
than originally estimated.
Spom's points were not ignored. But his warning was. He cautioned that the
electric power industry was going nuclear much too quickly, with construction getting
ahead of engineering in many areas. And he urged the industry to slow down and allow
the technology of nuclear generation to develop properly before committing itself to it.
Both the electric companies and the Atomic Energy Commission rejected Spom's
analysis of the situation, indicating that they found the grand old man of electric power
generation too conservative for their tastes. The nuclear power bandwagon was rolling
quickly, and a great many people in the Atomic Energy Commission, the utility industry
and General Electric and Westinghouse had a vested interest in keeping the wagon
moving.

By then, too. General Electric and Westinghouse were no longer alone in the
reactor building business. Both Babcock and Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, which
had been known primarily as boiler makers, had diversified and gotten into the commercial
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reactor business. By the end of the 1960s, operational nuclear plants in the United States
were generating 4,200-megawatts of electricity. But plants capable of generating a total
of 72,000-megawatts were either on order or actually under construction.
Once sales began to pick up, all four manufactures switched from the turn-key
contracts to "cost plus" contracts in which the utilities had to now pay for all cost
overruns during construction of their plants. Encouraged by a steady national demand for
electricity that averaged between 7 and 8 percent per year from 1960 through 1972,
utilities ordered 211 reactors between 1965 and 1974, more than ten times the total
number o f reactors that had been ordered prior to 1965. (Gwin, 1990, p.52)
Overall the Great Bandwagon Market of the 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the
phenomenal growth and development of the nuclear power industry. But the rapidly
developing nuclear industry should have listened to Philip Spom's warnings that nuclear
energy was expanding far too quickly in the United States. The era that witnessed
accelerated growth for the nuclear industry also witnessed the emergence of two efforts
which would ultimately move toward convergence and a nationally organized and vocal
movement against the development of nuclear power.
The first of these efforts was the emergence o f unafiBliated groups around the
United States that united specifically to oppose the construction or proposed construction
of nuclear plants in their areas. Ever since the proposal and construction of the
Shippingport plant, a small core of environmentalists, scientists, and informed private
citizens in the area had been concemed about whether nuclear power plants posed hazards
to the environment, their immediate neighbors, and the general public.
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Like many within the Atomic Energy Commission, these early adversaries had
found themselves able to accept the concept of small and mostly isolated nuclear power
plants. But during the mid-sixties, when the nuclear industry increased orders for reactors
and began looking at larger and larger plants, people had became more concemed about
the construction of plants near their communities and about nuclear development in
general.
Opposition grew because since the completion and operation of the Shippingport
reactor, scientists and engineers had shown that it was possible to generate electricity
using the power of the atom. What neither the scientists nor the electric power utilities or
the Atomic Energy Commission had been able to show was that it was practical.
This became obvious as a plethora of small groups emerged to oppose proposed
plants in their communities. One such group formed in 1962 when the Pacific Gas and
Electric Company announced plans to build a nuclear power plant north of San Francisco
on Bodega Head, the first of five reactors on the 225 acres it had purchased for the
purpose. A group of citizens banded together to oppose it, at first simply on the grounds
that land use and conservation would not be well served by destmction of Bodega Head.
Pacific Gas went ahead with its excavations anyway, in anticipation of the Atomic Energy
Commission construction license.
Because many conservation groups are simply no financial match for powerful
utility companies. Pacific Gas didn't anticipate much resistance fi’om the Northem
California Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor. But the group would not
quit, appearing at County Commission hearings, before the State Utilities Commission,
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and finally before the State Supreme Court.
"As it progressed, the group attracted some well-informed consultants and
prominent legal talents, so that by the time Atomic Energy Commission hearings were
scheduled, a formidable party of two thousand indignant, knowledgeable individuals had
rolled up its sleeves and dug in for a fight." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 54) More
importantly, by that time the original conservation arguments had given way to a far more
serious allegation; that Bodega Head #1 would be constructed on top of the San Andreas
Fault.
The San Andreas Fault extends from north of Bodega Bay almost to the Mexican
border, and is part of a larger system of instabilities. Smaller faults parallel to the San
Andreas pass through Bodega Head as well. Large earthquakes had occurred in the fault
area and San Francisco region several times in the past.
The Atomic Energy Commission's reactor Siting Criteria stated explicitly that "No
facility should be located closer that one-fourth mile from the surface location of a known
and active earthquake fault." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.56) Yet the reactor was to be
constructed 1000 feet fi'om the edge of the San Andreas fault, just about 300 feet shy of a
quarter of a mile.
According to a report by Lindsay Mattisona and Richard Daly in the April 1964
issue of Nuclear Information, the citizens group called in Dr. Pierre Saint-Armand, a
professional seismologist from the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, California.
After studying the excavation he reported two crucial findings.
First, the reactor site lay in an area where great strain accumulates in the geologic
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formations. He suggested that a great earthquake could be expected within the lifetime of
the reactor, a view which was ultimately confirmed by a number of authorities. In such an
event the site would "probably undergo some three or four meters permanent horizontal
displacement." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.50)
Second, Saint-Armand found that the reactor was being built, in eflfea, on sand.
After describing the ways in which the foundation material of crushed rock and alluvium
would shift or transmit shock waves, resulting in serious damage to the reactor, its cooling
system and supporting structures, Saint-Armand concluded; "A worse foundation situation
would be difiScult to envision." (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.50)
With this information in hand, the group's opposition to the plant turned from
simply the protection of Bodega Head to fears over the possibility of large scale radiation
release from an earthquake or other disaster;
The greatest hazard presented lies in the possibility that the tremendous
accumulation of radioactive fission products imprisoned in the fuel might
somehow be released into the atmosphere and be distributed by wind, and
contaminate inhabited areas . These fission products are more toxic per unit
weight than any other industrial known materials by a factor of a million to a
billion. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 11)
Other concerns extended not only to earthquakes, but to potential safety problems
with the large reactor being considered;
The actual experience with reactors in general is still quite limited and with
large reactors of the type now being considered, is non-existent. Therefore,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

79

because there would be a large number of people close by and because of lack
of experience...it is a matter of judgement and prudence to locate reactors
where the protection of distance will be present... placing large reactors close
to population centers will require considerable further improvements in safety,
and that none of the large power reactors...is considered suitable for location in
metropolitan areas. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p. 103)
In addition, the group opposing the Bodega Head plant found further reason for
resistance with the information contained in the report. Theoretical Possibilities and
Consequences of Mqjor Accidents in Large Nuclear Plants. As discussed in the previous
chapter this report, also referred to as the Brookhaven report, was commissioned and
released by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1957.
The report found that in the occurrence of a large reactor accident, as many as
3,400 people might be killed, 43,000 injured, and as much as $7 billion of property
damage done. People could be killed at distances up to 15 miles and injured as far away
as 45. Land contamination could extend for greater distances - agricultural restrictions
might prevail over an area of 150,000 square miles. (“Theoretical Possibilities,” 1957)
The group opposed to the Bodega Head plant expressed in 1969 the dangers of a
major plant accident in terms of the Brookhaven report:
The implications of these reckless siting policies are not difficult to imagine. A
breeze just a few miles per hour higher than average, or an unpredicted shift in
wind direction, might be all that is necessary to convert a local accident into
widespread disaster. For example, though Bodega Head, California, is fifty
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miles up the coast from San Francisco, some twenty miles farther from a major
population center than the distance hypothesized in the Brookhaven Report, an
accident at the proposed Bodega Head power plant might have seriously
affected San Francisco's population under weather conditions only slightly
different from those postulated in the Report. The Bodega Head Association
one day released fifteen hundred balloons from the reactor site, each carrying
the message: "This balloon could represent a radioactive molecule of strontium
90 or iodine 131." Some landed in Marin County, Petaluma and Napa and a
few in Richmond, all in the San Francisco Bay area. (Curtis & Hogan, 1969, p.
102)

Given the seismic discoveries and the efforts of the Bodega Head Association, the
Atomic Energy Commission had little choice but to act. Giving in to pressure by the
environmentalists, scientists and citizens, the commissions division of reactor licensing
canceled the plans for the nuclear reactor. The first cancellation in United States nuclear
history, the Pacific Gas and Electric debacle might have been expected to produce a pause
in America's headlong dive into nuclear power. But utilities and nuclear plant builders
took the cancellation in stride, barely hesitating before pressing on with their plans.
General Electric and Westinghouse engineers and designers dismissed the Bodega
Head cancellation as an anomaly rather than recognize it as a sign of public discontent
with the nuclear industry. Both companies were in the business of selling nuclear plants;
neither was about to be deterred.
As the industry pressed forward, a second effort emerged to hinder or halt the
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developing nuclear industry. Along with centralized citizens groups forming to oppose
plants in their areas, groups composed of professionals and scientists which already had
national memberships were beginning to turn a weary eye toward nuclear power. As Jim
Falk wrote, "Much of the 1960s and early 1970s anti-nuclear activity in the USA came
from concemed lawyers and scientists who, with the support of local citizens, began to
oppose nuclear projects at licensing hearings." (Falk, 1982, p. 55)
Intervention in the early 1970s against the licensing of the Calvert Cliffs, Vermont
Yankee, Indian Point, and Midland reactors, laid the legal groundwork for many similar
actions in the future. Scientists with a less optimistic view of the peaceful atom came
together in the Union of Concemed Scientists and offered a pragmatic, but negative view
of the status of nuclear power:
When one compares the cost and benefits of nuclear energy with the
altematives, it makes a poor showing. Nuclear power, through nobody's fault
in particular, has turned out to be a lemon, and it is foolish to keep pouring
good money after bad by supporting the continued development of nuclear
energy. (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p.p. 16-17)
Other scientists collaborated with citizen groups or conservation organizations
such as the Natural Resources Defense Council. One such organization, the Sierra Club,
split over the nuclear issue in 1969 when its president, David Brower, tried to get them to
oppose the siting of the Diablo Canyon reactor at Avila beach, Califomia. (Falk, 1982, p.
55) Brower went on to form the strongly anti-nuclear organization Friends of the Earth.
It set up numerous chapters across the country and offered a more ecological opposition
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to nuclear power:
Split wood, not atoms. Nuclear energy presents us with a fundamental choice
about what kind of society we wish to be. Do we wish to continue a way of
life that is wasteful of energy, relies on highly centralized technologies, and is
insensitive to ecological consequences? Or do we want to become a society
more in harmony with its natural environment?
Nuclear energy relies on the wrong kind of technology - centralized and
dangerous in the long run to the earth's ecology. We need to pursue
alternative, soft paths. We should change our way of life to conserve energy as
much as possible and to develop sources of energy that are ecologically safe
and renewable, and that lend themselves to decentralized production - for
example, sun, wind, and water. Small is beautiful. (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989, p. 16)
Friends of the Earth was not the only coalition to begin spreading an anti-nuclear
development message. Ralph Nader's citizens organization Critical Mass offered a more
populist, anti-corporate opposition to the development of nuclear power:
If Exxon owned the sun, would we have solar energy? The root of the
problem is the organization of nuclear production by profit-making
corporations, which minimizes accountability and control by the public.
Spokesmen for the nuclear industry are motivated to protect their own
economic interests, not the public interest. One cannot rely on what they say.
Company officials are frequently dishonest, greedy, and arrogant.
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The nuclear industry has used it political and economic power to
undermine the serious exploration of energy altematives. Public officials, who
are supposed to monitor the activities of the industry, they all too often are
captives of it. They function more to protect the industry than to protect the
public. (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 16)
As the decade of the 1970s began, diverse coalitions were forming across the
United States to oppose the development of nuclear power. Some centered around
particular concems: church, conservation, Indian land rights, peace, and pacifism. Others
brought together people from particular social groupings. Parents, women, technical
workers, students, and farmers became involved. One important influence on a number of
the groups was the idea of non-violent action, a strategy pushed forward by the
Quakers.(Falk, 1982, p.55)
In light of these early anti-nuclear efforts, the 1970s also saw the continued rapid
expansion of the nuclear industry. In 1972 numerous plants had been constructed across
the United States and utilities were ordering even more of nuclear. According to Stoler
nuclear power, in spite of the intervention of different groups was still largely unopposed
in the United States;
As the decade o f the seventies got under way, nuclear power enjoyed almost
unanimous support in both houses of Congress and strong support among the
general public, a large segment of which dismissed the anti-nuclear movement
as a collection of "back-to-nature crazies." (p. 63)
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PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
No matter how the anti-nuclear movement was initially characterized, the period
1963 to 1972 witnessed the dramatic growth of both the nuclear power industry and
opposition to its development. The catalytic event at the opening of this period was the
signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 by President John F. Kennedy.
Interestingly, the Test Ban initially had nothing to do with the development of nuclear
power - it simply provided guidelines for the continued testing o f nuclear weapons.
Prior to the signing to the treaty, those opposed to atmospheric testing did so
primarily because of the dangers of fallout - basically large amounts of radioactivity. With
the signing of the treaty, the main radiation danger in the United States would no longer
come from above-ground testing. The greatest potential for a large radiation release then
lied in nuclear reactors, most of which held radioactive inventories which might equal the
detonation of a nuclear weapon. It was only natural that as emphasis shifted from
weapons to reactors, that the people involved also shifted their opposition.
Consequently, the test ban was partly responsible for the growing body of antinuclear power development rhetoric during this period. The other cause was the rapid
development and expansion of the nuclear industry itself. Not only did the numbers and
different locations of plants increase, but the sheer size of the plants increased as well. In
terms of development, this period was known as the Great Bandwagon Market for nuclear
power.
Accordingly, as citizens groups formed and national organizations began to take
notice and action against the flourishing industry, the accompanying rhetoric reflected

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

85

issues of health, safety, environment and economics. Rhetoric focusing on health, safety
and environment were motivated by the potential dangers of radiation to humans, animals
and the environment. Rhetoric directed toward economics resulted from a growing
awareness that nuclear power would likely never be too cheap to meter.
These issues, radiation and economics, were not significantly different from the
issues which resulted in opposition rhetoric in the period covering 1953 to 1962. During
that period, opposition rhetoric was characterized by a growing, but not very complete
understanding of the potential dangers of radiation had economics involved in operating
nuclear plants. As such, rhetoric during this period was characterized as a rhetorical
package named Mirage.
As its name implies. Mirage framed opposition to nuclear power in terms of a
power source that once appeared to be the panacea to our energy needs. In reality,
however, this was likely only an illusion because the growing body of evidence about
radiation and economics would demonstrate that nuclear power was potentially hazardous
and costly.
As the Mirage package encountered more contemporary opposition rhetoric based
upon a greater understanding of radiation hazards and economics, it did not undergo a
significant evolution into a new package. Why did the package not evolve? Simply
because the issues addressed by opposition rhetoric in the period 1963 to 1972 reflected
the same overall attitude toward nuclear energy; that it should not be developed because
its promise of safe, hazard-free and cost effective operations will likely never be realized.
If anything. Mirage is a more "robust" interpretive package during this period.
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Vas Mirage package in the previous period contained rhetoric based upon a growing
understanding of radiation and economic problems. Vas Mirage package dominant during
this period is the result of rhetoric based upon a more comprehensive understanding of the
problems involved in nuclear power. Thus, this package could be referred to as Mirage 2.
Consider this passage, constructed of opposition discourse from the period, reflecting the
more mature Mirage package;
It is important for mankind to reflect seriously upon the significance of his enterprises,
to assess possible ways in which temporary advantages are secured only as the
intolerable cost o f long-range liabilities. Nothing better illustrates this truth than the
contrast between the potential catastrophic consequences of atomic power and its
ephemeral, even illusory benefits. A single major mishap in a nuclear reactor will
cause extreme damage, not because of the explosive force, but because of the
radioactive contamination...So far we have been extremely lucky...But with the spread
of industrialization, with the greater number of simians monkeying around with things
that we cannot completely control, sooner or later a fool will prove greater than the
proof even in a foolproof system. Human ingenuity has never had at its command a
wider choice of tools with which to stimulate the economy, provide for the general
welfare or just make money - all this is being done so rapidly that there is scarcely time
to look around a assess the safety and economic side-effects of the new technology put
into action.
Notice that this Mirage package not only reflects the dangers of radiation and a
rapidly expanding nuclear industry, but begins to predict the potentiality of a disaster from
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a nuclear plant accident. In the previous period(s), speculations about potential accidents
were based upon an incomplete understanding of the dangers. Forecasts for disaster were
not only based more on fact than speculation, they also set the stage for the rhetoric which
would result from a nationally organized and cohesive movement against nuclear power
development in the 1970s.
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CHAPTERS
Period Four
There are only seven percent of the people of the world living in the United States, and we
use thirty percent of all the energy. That isn't bad; that is good. That means we are the
richest, strongest people in the world, and that we have the highest standard of living in
the world. That is why we need so much energy, and may it always be that way.
—President Richard M. Nixon

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The period five-year period 1973 to 1978 witnessed probably the greatest amount
of agitation against the development of nuclear power in the United States. Since
opposition essentially grew with the development of nuclear power, the anti-nuclear
movement that has generated publicity since the 1970s can be viewed as a continuation of
earlier antinuclear power efforts. "Nonetheless," wrote Jerome Price, "it became a largescale social movement with a distinct identity only after the devastating consequences of
the 1973-1974 energy crises." (p. 9)
Undoubtedly the 1973 Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel and the
resulting embargo of oil to supporters of Israel by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a turning point in nuclear power development. The
resulting and first "energy crisis" in the United States was actually the result of numerous
factors, but never before the early 1970s had energy shortages been so directly related to
world politics and instability.
An awareness of an impending energy crises had, in fact, existed in the government
with a projection of expansion in nuclear energy as being the eventual cornerstone of
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energy policy. But the OPEC oil embargo quickly altered priorities and the aim of
America's energy policy was to make the nation free from dependence upon foreign oil by
developing energy sources like nuclear power as quickly as possible.
Consequently, for a limited time at the onset of the 1970s, nuclear power
development continued to enjoy exceptional growth in the United States. Peter Stoler
framed nuclear power development early in the decade in this way:
"When I was seventeen," begins the ballad popularized by Frank Sinatra, "it was a very
good year." And not the only such year. The song goes on to describe other good
years: "When I was twenty-one...when I was thirty-five..." Like the singer, the nuclear
power industry had its good years, too. In fact, during the late sixties and mid
seventies, it had several of them, fat years in the biblical sense, years during which it
seemed that everything was going its way and that the future that nuclear enthusiasts
had been predicting for years had finally arrived, (p. 78)
There were actually several reasons why the beginning of the 1970s initially looked
good for nuclear energy and its supporters. One, was the support the industry still
received from the government, which not only promoted nuclear power but also turned a
blind eye toward some of its most obvious and pressing problems. The second was the
growing realization that the age of abundant, inexpensive oil was rapidly drawing to a
close.
A third reason for the industry's unqualified optimism was the rate at which the
United States economy - and the demand for electrical energy - was growing. In the ten
years between the years 1963 and 1973, the demand for electricity grew at an average rate
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of 7.3 percent a year. (Stoler p. 79) American industry was flourishing and using more
and more electrical power.
Americans, as consumers, owned more electrical appliances and used more
electricity than anyone else in the world and were, it seemed, the world's most prolific
users of energy. Americans were using millions o f kilowatts of electricity to light their
homes, to wash their clothes and to run their television sets. There seemed, as far as the
people in the utility industry could see, no reason why they should not keep doing so
forever.
Accordingly, the early 1970s found United States reactor manufactures continuing
to ride the wave of prosperity. Business was still good. Orders for reactors were pouring
in to both General Electric and Westinghouse in suflBcient numbers to make those firms
optimistic about the future. Demand for electric power was rising steadily. Utilities were
not only building nuclear plants; they were also ordering a plethora of fossil fuel-burning
plants.
But as Murphy's Law states, anything that can go wrong will go wrong. The
energy bubble burst. In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, members of OPEC raised
the price of oil fi’om approximately $2.15 to $11 per barrel. The bubble burst when a
number of OPEC nations imposed an imbargo and actually cut off oil shipments to the
United States as well as to certain other nations whose policies toward Israel they found
unacceptable.
The oil embargo quickly and severely impacted the United States. America
imported less than ten percent of its oil from OPEC. But several other nations received
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almost all their oil from these countries, and the United States had obligated itself to
assure their supplies, even if it meant selling America's oil to those countries.
The embargo came as a sobering shock to American consumers. It was also a
warning that the country had become dependent upon outside energy sources and a
reminder that the fuel American's took for granted could not, even under the best of
circumstances, be expected to last forever.
The United States, characteristically, sought a quick fix for the problem. President
Richard Nixon and members of his administration offered one. Nuclear power, in which
the United States was world leader, was seen as the way of reducing America's need for
foreign oil and freeing it from the risk of what he termed "energy blackmail." Nixon
launched "Project Independence," a program which was aimed at having America get half
of all its electricity from nuclear power by the year 2000. (Stoler, 1985, p. 87)
The President's plan appeared sound at the time. Demand for electricity in the
United States had been rising steadily for the past decade. But that demand was not about
to continue. The embargo and resulting "oil shock" stunned Americans and made them
more consciences of using less energy. For the first time, Americans began efforts to
conserve fuel and electrical energy. Many confined their efforts to small actions such as
shutting off unused lights. But others went much further. Realizing than maintaining their
present level of energy usage was going to prove expensive - assuming that it was even
possible - large numbers of Americans went on energy savings sprees.
Within a short time, the whole picture of energy economics in the United States
began to shift radically. By all expectations, atomic energy should have become more
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competitive in this environment. Instead it sent the cost of the reactors soaring, at a rate
higher than the cost increases in fossil-fliel burning plants. With these costs and the new
wave of conservation, the demand for nuclear reactors began to decline.
Utility orders for new plants declined drastically, from forty-one in 1973 and
twenty-six in 1974, to four in 1975, three in 1976, four in 1977, and two in 1978. Plant
cancellations quickly outnumbered plant orders. In 1978 the number of domestic reactors
in operation, on order or under construction dropped to 197, the lowest since 1972.
The oil shortages were not the only problem to plague the nuclear power industry
during the decade of the 1970s. The mid-1970s, and the year 1976 in particular, found the
antinuclear movement gaining strength and, in some instances, actually taking the
offensive in the battle over nuclear power development.
The advance of the antinuclear forces had been fueled by the publication of the
Rasmussen Report, which described the potential disastrous consequences of a nuclear
accident. The movement further picked up momentum as a series of nuclear plant
accidents suggested that reactors were not being constructed or run as well as they could
be. "But what really got the antinuclear forces rolling," wrote Peter Stoler, "were the
resignations, during 1976, of several long-time nuclear engineers, who not only questioned
the whole concept of nuclear plant safety, but came over to the opposition and brought
their expertise with them." (p. 89)
The first of the highly publicized resignations occurred in January of 1976 when a
electrical engineer with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced his conversion to
nuclear energy adversary. The engineer, who had been one of forty-eight project
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managers at the agency, had been in charge of conducting safety reviews at a number of
nuclear plants, including several at Indian Point just north of New York City.
He resigned, he said, because of frustration over the Regulatory Commission's lack
of interest in plant safety, and in doing so, he gave both the agency and the residents of
New York some cause for thought. In his letter of resignation, which was released to the
media and widely quoted, he said that after reviewing the design of the Indian Point
reactors he had come to the conclusion that nothing but "sheer good luck" had prevented
an accident from occurring at the site. (Pringle and Spigelman, 1981, p.p. 357-358)
The shock waves from that resignation had more or less subsided when, a month
later, three senior engineers resigned from General Electric's nuclear division in California
and announced that they were joining the antinuclear cause. One o f the engineers fueled
the antinuclear fires by revealing that he had become increasingly alarmed at the
technological shallowness of the engineers who conceived current plant designs, and the
regulators who approved them. He described nuclear power as a technological monster,
and questioned whether anyone was actually in control of the industry.
By autumn of that year, another Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer had also
resigned. Ronald Fluegge charged that the Commission had either "covered up or brushed
aside nuclear safety problems of far-reaching significance." He also expressed the opinion
that many plants were being allowed to operate, and in populated areas, despite "known
safety deficiencies" that could result in serious accidents. (Pringle & Spigelman, 1981, p.
358)
The impact of these resignations on the nuclear industry was enormous.
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"Throughout the sixties and early seventies, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and the industry had all been able to dismiss antinuclear groups
as emotional flower children or as campus upstarts looking for something, anything,
against which they could protest." (Stoler, 1985, p. 90) Nor had the industry found it any
more difficult to dismiss or downplay the criticism o f biologist who feared the effects of
radiation or the handful of physicists who opposed nuclear power out of fear of nuclear
proliferation.
But industry leaders and other nuclear power supporters found it difficult to
disregard the criticisms of the engineers who had once been the mainstays of the industry engineers who had initially become involved with nuclear power because they believed in
it and felt that the technology was manageable.
The news media devoted considerable space to the engineer resignations and their
attacks on the credibility of the nuclear power industry. "But the mass media were not the
only outlets to seen the significance of this crack in nuclear power's once unbroken facade.
The industry journal Nucleonics Week carried a story headlined, 'Four Resignations
Radically Change Complexion of Nuclear Fight.'" (Pringle & Spigelman, 1981, p. 358)
The resignations, and the evidence they provided of dissention within the ranks of
the nuclear power industry, gave the antinuclear forces the needed ammunition to mount a
major assault on nuclear power. By the close of 1976 antinuclear critics managed to force
questions on nuclear power on ballots in six states. It didn't matter that none of the
referenda passed, or even that the most successful was defeated by a margin of two to
one. Nuclear advocates cited the defeat of the referenda as a victory over the irrational
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fear of the atom being spread by antinuclear activist.
But supporters were not able to take too much comfort from the votes. For the
antinuclear forces’ mere success in getting the issue onto the ballots showed their growing
strength and gave the industry good reason to believe that its popularity was waning and it
was no longer seen as the source that would provide the solution to America's energy
problems. The antinuclear movement had evolved from a force that could be easily
dismissed to one that could no longer be ignored.
The extent of the antinuclear feeling was becoming more visible in the United
States. Antinuclear action had once been limited to petitioning and occasional picketing.
By the mid 1970s, it had escalated into attempts to block plant accesses and occasional
acts of civil disobedience. The movement had grown from local groups opposed to
specific plants to regional and national coalitions. Bolstered by more and more technical
converts, the antinuclear forces began to scale up their protests, from demonstrations
involving hundreds to actions involving thousands.
Naturally, as more organizations formed or joined the movement against nuclear
power during this period, the quantity of nuclear power opposition rhetoric also increased.
Groups such as the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists joined with newlyformed groups in speaking out against nuclear power development in the 1970s. The
Sierra Club, whom had already begun to speak-out against nuclear power in the late
1960s, stressed the need for continued intervention:
The safe energy movement has two basic tasks: stopping nuclear power and building
an energy infrastructure based on the elegant use of renewable sources of energy. We
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need to intervene in the licensing process... We must fight in the political arena against
the industry lobbyists who effectively control Congress and many state legislatures.
We must non-violently place our bodies in the way of nuclear construction... Day in
and day out the energy industry's lies and scare campaigns must be countered... In the
end our task is to convince the American people that we don't have to make a pact
with the devil to solve the energy crises. (Grossman, 1982, p.262)
Friends of the Earth, another early opponent of the peaceful atom, offered an
opposition more closely linked to the continued development of nuclear weapons:
The present era of nuclear roulette poses a far greater threat to all living things than
the Vietnam war did, because proliferation could stumble us into the final war. It is
not too late to change course, but it will be too late too soon if too few urge the
change. Exponential growth has led to a destructive race for more and more energy.
That race led to nuclear power, the once bright hope, which as turned into the greatest
threat to the future nuclear proliferation, which no one wants. History will admire the
brilliance that went into trying to get the atom to work peacefully, but will admire
more the wisdom of choosing not the radioactive path. (Grossman, 1982, p.263)
Environmental and activist attorney, Irving Like, offered a opposition approach
based more upon the economical and social impacts of nuclear power development in the
United States:
The Administration's nuclear power plant program will be abandoned if it becomes
apparent that it does not command a domestic consensus and its cost is so prohibitive
as to raise intolerable economic problems... The Vietnam war was terminated by the
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U.S. Government when political and social opposition destroyed any domestic
consensus for continuing the war. Thus, antinuclear strategy should focus on
persuading the government and corporate policy makers that the nuclear fission option
threatens to destroy the political, social, and economic fabric as did Vietnam.
(Grossman, 1982, p. 263)
The SHAD Alliance, a relative newcomer to the antinuclear movement, also
stressed the importance of continued activity against nuclear power:
We do not believe that any one type of activity could end nuclear madness by itself.
However, we are convinced that the collective efforts of citizens joining together on
all fi'onts will force nukes to be abandoned. Ultimately, the laws which protect nuclear
studies, power and weapons will be changed. It may take a revolution to stop nuclear
pollution. (Grossman, 1982, p.264)
The Nuclear Hazards Information Center offered their own perspective on halting
the development of nuclear power based upon a return to the community centered
opposition:
Based on limited success citizens have had in halting nuclear power, it appears that the
most effective method is door-to-door visits to friends and neighbors followed by a
multi-sponsored town assembly at which prominent speakers present the case against
nuclear power... For many years nuclear opponents exhausted their resources trying to
deny licenses by intervening in the regulatory process, which, of course, is rigged. To
date it has also been unproductive to lobby Congress and put pressure on the
Executive and federal agencies, but increasingly citizens are getting through to
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township, county and state governing bodies. With the growing strength o f the
movement, a unified drive to change the composition of Congress might for the first
time be fiiiitfiil... (Grossman, 1982, p.265)
John GoflSnan and the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility presented nuclear
power opposition based upon the repeal of the Price Anderson Act;
If the President, the Congress, and the nuclear industry believed in the safety of
nuclear power, they would all immediately demand repeal of the Price-Anderson Act that pernicious law which absolves the utility industry of liability for the causation of
your death and of your property damage in a nuclear accident. The nuclear menace
would end in 24 hours after repeal of the Price-Anderson Act, because utilities will
risk your life but not their dollars. They have no confidence in nuclear safety... Repeal
of that law would be enough to end the nuclear power problem. (Ibid.)
Connie Hogarth and the Women's International League For Peace and Freedom,
offered this about ending nuclear power:
We believe very deeply that nuclear power and nuclear weapons will not be stopped
until the people want them stopped - until people realized that their lives and their very
future depend on whether we stop this technology. We have been conned by experts
and expertise bringing us close to any number of disasters: from PCB's to the atom
bomb to nuclear power plants to plutonium. It is time people realize that they have the
judgement to determine what's best for them. We think we have to use every non
violent means at our disposal to make the changes that are to guarantee a future.
(Grossman, 1982, p.266)
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And finally. Labor Leader William Winpisinger presented opposition based upon
economics and safety:
Nuclear Energy is Kurt Vonnegut's Ice Nine. It is the Agent Orange of the energy
industry. It is the most inflationary means of electric power. It is, as Barry Commoner
has said, a dumb way to boil water. The cost of a nuclear plant is two-and-a-half times
the cost of coal conversion... There is no such thing as low-level radiation. There is
only deadly radiation. You can't see, feel, taste, or hear it... But the big energy
conspiracy tells us that without nuclear power, plants all over won't have enough
energy. They say, we have to have nuclear power because we need the jobs. More
energy blackmail. Nuclear blackmail. Job blackmail. (Grossman, 1982, p.266)
These excerpts are but a few examples of representative nuclear power opposition
rhetoric from this period. Overall, most antinuclear power rhetoric during this period
embodied the same concerns and issues - usually safety, economics or more
environmentally "fnendly" sources of energy. Most nuclear opponents were in agreement
concerning their vocal opposition or direct action against the construction on nuclear
plants. And few regarded protesting against the proposal or construction of nuclear
power plants as a lark.
A handfiil of antinuclear activists were probably younger people who simply
wanted to be against something. Others might have been unable to make the distinction
between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. But most of those opposed to nuclear
power acted out of the conviction that the plants were unnecessary and uneconomical.
And almost all acted out of the conviction that nuclear power plants, designed, operated.
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and regulated as they were, were very unsafe.
Opponents protested in the belief that the benefits of nuclear power in no way
justified the risks that the public was being asked to accept. Their belief was reinforced by
the message then being preached by engineers then known as the General Electric Three.
Of the defections fi’om the nuclear industry, Stoler wrote that, "The message was
nothing if not chilling." (p. 94) After resigning, the three had submitted testimony to the
Atomic Energy Commission that concluded with these words. "The cumulative effect of
all defects and deficiencies in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power
plants makes a nuclear power plant accident, in our opinion, a certain event." (Pringle &
Spigelman, p. 359)
The question, they said, is not whether a nuclear plant accident would occur. The
question, they declared, is when and where? It was a question that would be answered a
few years later in 1979.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
With the resignations and growing opposition, the period from 1973 through 1978
could be viewed as the era in which the scales were tipped in the development of nuclear
power and nuclear power opposition. Both nuclear power and its opposition were
developing consistently at the beginning of this period - each could be viewed as generally
being in an upward growth trend.
Both were also fueled a catalytic event in 1973, the energy embargo and crises
resulting from the Yom Kippur war between Israel and Egypt. Interestingly enough, this
catalytic event would not only be responsible for a large body of antinuclear discourse, it

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

101

would be the event that would tip the scales of development in favor of nuclear opposition
forces.
Prior to the war and the energy crises in the United States, nuclear energy
development had practically run away. Electric utilities were ordering new and larger
plants to be built all over the United States. The emerging nuclear power opposition was
also developing quickly. Groups and coalitions were forming in communities where
utilities were proposing the construction of plants, and nationally organized environmental
groups had begun to turn a watchful eye toward the industry.
As the energy crises gripped the United States, nuclear proponents saw it as the
justification for the rapidly developing industry - and orders for new and even larger
reactors again increased. Opponents saw, on the other hand, saw the opportunity to
propose alternate forms of energy as well as energy conservation programs.
In the end, it was the new wave of energy conservationism combined with
mounting plant construction costs which would cause the electric utilities to stop ordering
plants and cancel bids for many they had already ordered. Oddly enough, the event which
should have justified the existence of nuclear power was partly responsible for its sudden
retarded growth during this period. As a result nuclear power development decelerated,
while the growth of an organized nuclear power opposition continued.
Consequently, this resulted in not only an upsurge in nuclear power opposition, but
an upsurge in opposition rhetoric. The issues at the core of this body of rhetoric reflected
the same basic concerns about the dangers of radiation to humans and the environment as
well as the inflated costs of constructing and operating plants. The interpretive package
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which framed these same issues in the previous period, 1963 through 1972, was
characterized by the term M/rage. The M rage package framed nuclear power
development in terms of a power source that once appeared to be the panacea to
America's electrical energy needs. In reality, however, the development of nuclear power
was more illusion because the growing body of evidence about radiation and economics
demonstrated that its potential risks outweighed its potential benefits.
During the period 1973 through 1978, \h&Mirage package encountered additional
rhetoric as citizens and environmental groups and newly-formed coalitions became more
vocal in their opposition to nuclear power. The additional rhetoric not only contained
concerns about radiation and cost, but reflected a belief that America was becoming
committed to atomic energy, but not yet committed beyond the point of ending nuclear
power generation in favor of alternative forms of energy.
References to this commitment did not occur in earlier rhetorical packages simply
because the development of nuclear power did not "take-off' until the 1960s. Early
opponents were resisting the initial development of nuclear power. Opponents during this
period were resisting any continued development or advancement of nuclear power.
As a whole, the amalgamation of new and old rhetoric resulted in the evolution
and formation o f a new rhetorical package during this period. The new interpretive
package represented the belief that the United States had partially committed itself to a
form of energy which was dangerous, economically unwise, and impractical compared to
alternative forms of energy.
This package, which can be called Devil's Bargain, represented the premise that
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through the commitment to nuclear power, the United States had become somewhat of an
atomic junkie - addicted to a source of energy both hazardous and becoming more
expensive to acquire. Like any drug addiction, nuclear power development was framed in
the package as a Devil's Bargain. America could feel good about its new found energy
independence, but the price was radioactive dangers and rising costs.
Further, Devil's Bargain implied that America's partial commitment to nuclear
power, like the drug addiction, would lead to a tragic outcome. Consider the following
passage, created from opposition discourse from the period, which illustrates the Devil's
Bargain package.
So nuclear power turns out to be a bargain with the devil. There are clear benefits
such as inexhaustible electricity and an energy supply that does not depend on the
whims of OPEC. But sooner or later, there will be a terrible price to pay. We are
damned if we do and damned if we don't. And the deeper we get in, the harder it is to
get out.
As with the previous package. Devil's Bargain clearly predicts the potentiality of a
disaster from a nuclear plant accident. Simply put, if the United States did not curb its
development of nuclear power, there most certainly would be a disaster. This aspect of
the Devil's Bargain package was clearly a prophesy for a nuclear reactor related disaster
and it set the stage for rhetoric which would occur in 1979, the final year in this study.
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CHAPTER 6
Period Five
We screwed up - and I mean by "we" the nuclear community, the vender and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Davis-Besse was ample warning, and if we had paid ample
attention to it Three Mile Island could have been prevented. If you want to use the term
"complacency" to describe our behavior, I won't quibble with you, but the term I'd rather
use is "mind set," or "attitude." I'd had the attitude that reactors were fairly forgiving, in
the sense that they could withstand a lot of problems without having those problems turn
into serious accidents. I don't feel that way anymore.
—Denwood Ross, Deputy Director, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 1981

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The final period in this thesis examines only a single year, or to be more precise,
several months during the year 1979. "On March 28, 1979," wrote Price, "the world was
abruptly awakened to the perils of nuclear power when a complex series of human and
mechanical errors resulted in the release of radioactive gases into central Pennsylvania."
(Price, 1982, p. 19)
"At Three Mile Island, on Wednesday, 28 March, the theoretical possibility of a
core meltdown disaster became separated from actuality by only a thin tissue of lucky
circumstance." (Falk, 1982, p. 33) At 4:00 a.m. in the control room of Three Mile Island's
Unit Two reactor, lights suddenly began to blink on the instrument panel. A siren sounded
the warning, the first of over 200 alarms that were to sound within the next five minutes.
(Falk, 1982, p.29) Over the public address system an operator aimounced that a routine
turbine trip had occurred in the Unit Two reactor.
In the control room, that first alarm sounded to indicate the automatic closure
104
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of the pump in the secondary cooling system of the Unit Two reactor when the turbine trip
occurred. This caused little concern. The operators had encountered similar "trips"
before, and the plant had developed eight such events since the previous October.
Throughout the plant, maintenance crews had worked for weeks to refuel the Unit
One reactor and bring the Unit Two reactor on-line. Unit Two had been operating for less
than three months and had been plagued with start-up problems. In January it had been
shut down for nearly two weeks so that leaky valves could be replaced and in February
still other valves and pumps had to be repaired.
Instrument panel lights revealed the cause of the turbine trip. Half an hour earlier,
at 3:30 a.m., workers had begun cleaning a polishing unit that traps minerals in the
secondary cooling system between the two steam generators and the turbine. During the
cleaning, the operation of a booster pump in the secondary system had become impaired.
At thirty-seven seconds past 4:00 a m. this caused the associated feed water pumps to trip.
The result was that the two steam generators were now losing their supply of secondary
cooling water.
The steam generators were designed to operate like giant tea kettles, powered
from the core heat transmitted by the primary cooling system. But the accident that had
closed off the secondary water would leave the steam generators completely dry within
two minutes and unable to remove heat from the core. As the steam generators began to
overheat, the temperature and pressure in the primary system also began to rise.
Five seconds later, the steam venting from the core vessel through the emergency
relief valve had, at last, brought the pressure down to normal. At this point the valve
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should have closed automatically. But this time the valve stuck open. No lights were
provided to indicate to operators that the relief valve was incorrectly open. As primary
coolant continued to flow out into a reserve tank, the pressure began to fall and the core
temperature began to rise.
In the control room the rapidly approaching crises was obscured. For the primary
cooling system, no light indicated that coolant was flowing out through the stuck relief
valve. Operators testified later that the relief valve had leaked on so many occasions in the
past that they paid no attention to gauges showing that the system was overheating. In the
secondary system the panel lights showed that the auxiliary pumps had commenced
operation. A tag noting that feed-water isolation valves were on had been attached to the
panel, but coincidentally obscured a light that would have warned the operators that the
auxiliary pumps were not working correctly.
This was basically the first eight minutes of the accident. It was only the
beginning. Over the next few hours the confusion continued. At 4; 10 a m., even as the
secondary system began to regain pressure, an operator turned off the remaining
emergency pump, quite possibly leaving the core partially uncovered. After ninety
seconds he apparently changed his mind and restarted the pumps.
At 5:15 a m. steam in the primary cooling pumps threatened to break them,
causing the operators to turn them off. At 5:40 a.m., following what they understood to
be standard procedure in such a situation, they shut down the auxiliary feed water pumps
for the same reason. Once again the core temperature soared off scale. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission estimates that this time it may have reached 1,980 degrees
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Celsius, the temperature region in which theoretical calculations predict a core meltdown
would start. (Falk, p.p. 36-37) As luck would have it, it did not.
Outside the reactor building the first sign that anything was wrong was the
sounding of a radiation alarm at 6:50 a m. In the auxiliary building, to which hot
radioactive water had been pumped, steam relief valves had opened automatically.
Extractor fans started up, taking the radioactive steam to the atmosphere in a plume which
drifted towards Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
At 6:50 a m. an on-site emergency was declared and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and some local officials were notified. At 9:00 a m. the mayor of neighboring
Middletown was finally informed of the emergency. At 11:00 a.m., seven-hours after the
first moments of the accident, a general emergency was declared. It was the first ever at a
commercial nuclear instillation in the history of nuclear power.
Despite the growing problem there was little atmosphere of crises outside the
plant. When the early morning shift of workers arrived they were turned back by locked
gates. At they waited they tossed frisbees back and forth. Commented one worker, "It
was all fun and games at first"(Falk, 1982, p.37). Jack Herbein, vice-president of
Metropolitan Edison, the company which operates Three Mile Island, told reporters,
"When we say general emergency, it does not mean that an emergency exists. There was
nothing that was catastrophic or unplanned for." (Falk, 1982, p.37)
Herbein was only partly right. As Stoler wrote about the accident:
The TMI accident killed no one, at least outright. The plant did not blow up, melt
down, or cause people to glow in the dark, though the accident did generate a certain
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amount of mordant humor, some of which could be seen in some souvenir T-shirts put
on sale shortly after the accident. The shirts showed a sketch of the island's familiar
hourglass-shaped cooling towers and bore the legend; 'I survived TMI - I think.'
(Stoler, 1985, p.96)
In retrospect, the accident was not anywhere near as bad as it could have been.
But it did an enormous amount of damage nonetheless. The accident showed the public,
government, and power industry that accidents - and potentially disastrous accidents in
particular - were more than just statistical possibilities.
The accident changed people's perceptions about nuclear risks from the
commercial nuclear industry. It showed that major accidents, accidents that could
endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands, that could meet all the conditions of the
Rasmussen Report's worst-case scenario, could really happen. It showed too, that neither
utility company executives nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission really knew how to
deal with major mishaps at nuclear power plants.
It also showed that the public was not being particularly well protected by the
agency that licensed and monitored nuclear power plants. One of the things that was
revealed early in the period following the accident at Three Mile Island was that the
reactor had been plagued with problems since it first went into operation and that neither
the utility nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had done much to solve them.
The accident at Three Mile Island did not kill or injure anyone immediately, as
company officials were quick to note. But it did kill public trust, or at least wound, the
commercial nuclear industry. Americans might have been willing to trust the industry and
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the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the accident. Now the public was suspicious
of both. "It's like having your wife catch you in bed with another women," lamented a
utility company executive. "Even if the marriage stays together, things are never the same
again. The faith that makes the relationship work is gone." (Stoler, 1985, p. 116)
Not only had the public's trust been severely damaged, but their reactions to the
accident were immediate and harsh. Price demonstrated in his book The Antinuclear
Movement:
Shouting, "We all live in Pennsylvania," 35,000 people attended an antinuclear rally in
Hanover, West Germany, to oppose plans for an underground dump for nuclear
wastes. In San Francisco, demonstrators played 'dead' outside a utility office, and a
'die-in' was held outside the office of the Philadelphia Electric Company. Proposed
bans on new nuclear power plants were introduced into state legislatures, although in
Austin, Texas, voters approved a bond issue to allow the city to continue participating
in a nuclear project. The largest antinuclear rally ever took place in Washington D C ,
involving an estimated 65,000 people, following a demonstration o f20,000 people in
San Francisco, (p. 10)
According to the New York Times the demonstrators in Washington D C ,
included representatives of the Communist party, the Socialist Worker's party, the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Union of Concerned Scientists,
the Gray Panthers, and the Gay Liberation Movement, among others. (Price, 1982, p.20 )
One month later there were more mass demonstrations throughout the United
States as June 5, 1979 was designated as International Anti-Nuclear Day by movement
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groups. Demonstrators were arrested in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Massachusetts. Six
hundred protestors out of an estimated 15,000 were arrested outside of the Shoreham,
Long Island, nuclear power plant, and in Spain, one demonstrator was killed. (Price, p.
20)
The size o f the demonstrations and the number of persons arrested grew larger and
larger. In October, at Battery Park, New York, over 300,000 people turned out for a
demonstration in which many of the movement people of the 1960s and early 1970s, such
as Jane Fonda, reappeared. A few weeks later, 1,045 persons were arrested at the New
York Stock Exchange in another mass demonstration against nuclear power.
The rhetoric which accompanied this sudden flourish of antinuclear power
demonstrations reflected previous concerns over radiation hazards and economics as well
as an element of lessons-leamed. In a sense, the rhetoric reflected that the accident at
Three Mile Island validated all of the past efforts of nuclear power opposition. In May,
1979, for instance, the Sierra Club adopted a stronger position on nuclear power based
upon the events at Three Miles Island:
Events at Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant reaffirm the validity of the Sierra Club
policy on the lack of safety in nuclear plants and in the nuclear fuel cycle. These
problems can lead to adverse health and environmental effects. The possibility of
human failure dooms the nuclear fuel cycle to unacceptable risks. The Sierra Club
continues to oppose construction of any new commercial nuclear fission power plants.
Further, the Sierra Club supports the systematic reduction of society's dependence on
nuclear fission as a source of electric power and recommends a phased closure and
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decommissioning of operating commercial nuclear fission electric power reactors.
(“Sierra Club Policy,” 1979)
According to McCracken, a book released shortly after the accident by Robert
Jungk, The New Tyranny: How Nuclear Power Enslaves Us. also provided cause to
oppose nuclear power in light of accidents like Three Mile Island:
The danger inherent in the use of nuclear energy has been with us now for decades
and, in spite on many popular efforts to curtail its spread, governments persist in
expansive programs for its use while telling people that little or no threat exists. The
radiation leakage at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania is the
most recent example of the potential for disaster. Even as massive amounts of
radiation were being released into the surrounding atmosphere, people were told it
was a 'controlled leak' and that there was little danger. (McCracken, 1982, p. 161)
The National Audubon Society offered the following position on nuclear power
following the accident:
We now have the chance to halt further construction of the present design and to send
the nuclear designers back to the drawing boards. If additional nuclear power plants
are to be built, let them be based on a design in which safety comes first, a system
which is easy to analyze, a system which is designed specifically to contain
meltdowns... If our society is to control technology rather than let it control us, we
must make choices between technologies. We cannot keep giving engineers or
scientists unlimited chances to run large-scale experiments which put us all at risk...
We should think carefully whether nuclear technology is necessary. When other

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

112

problems with nuclear power are considered, such as the risk of weapons proliferation
and the risks for nuclear wastes, the case against nuclear power gets stronger and
stronger. We already depend on one unsatisfactory source of electricity: coal. Do we
want to lock ourselves into another one? (Kaku & Trainer, 1982, p.p. 106-107)
Even a major study of the Three Mile Island accident sponsored by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission came to a conclusion that was less than favorable about the
further development of nuclear power:
An attitude of complacency pervaded both the industry and NRG, an attitude that the
engineered design safeguards built into today's plants were more than adequate, that
an accident like that at Three Mile Island would not occur - in the peculiar jargon of
the industry, that such an accident was not a 'credible event." (Hilgartner, Bell &
O'Connor, 1982, p. 136)
The report also concluded that:
unless fundamental changes... are made in the way commercial nuclear reactors are
built, operated, and regulated in this country, similar accidents - perhaps with the
potentially serious consequences to public health and safety that were only narrowly
averted at Three Mile Island - are likely to recur... Just as the last major reactor
accident, the Brown's Ferry fire, slipped beneath the surface of the sea of daily
concerns 4 years ago, so can Three Mile Island join it in the coming years. It will take
dogged perseverance in the nuclear industry and in the government to truly learn the
lessons of TMI. We are not reassured by what we see so far. (Hilgartner, Bell &
O'Connor, p. 141)
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These passages of opposition rhetoric, although not nearly a complete sample of
all opposition rhetoric which occurred after the accident, demonstrated that the major
impact of the accident at Three \ftle Island was psychological. "The accident," wrote
Stoler, "gave a frightening shot in the arm to the antinuclear forces, which immediately
launched a drive designed to halt further construction forever." (p. 125)
"This is the beginning of the end," said consumer advocate Ralph Nader as Nuclear
Regulatory Commission engineers and reporters were speeding toward southern
Pennsylvania following the announcement of the accident. Others agreed and worked to
make Nader's prediction a reality. Dr. Helen Caldicott, a long time antinuclear activist,
and Dr. Ernest Stemglass, a University of Pittsburgh researcher, visited Harrisburg and
participated in news conferences at which they said that even low-level radiation, like that
presumably emitted at Three Mile Island, could cause genetic damage, birth defects, and
cancer. (Stoler, 1985, p. 125)
Some environmentalists and activists demanded the closing of all Babcock and
Wilcox plants, figuring that what went wrong with the Three Mile Island plant could just
as easily go wrong at other facilities. Others intensified their assaults - legal and political against plants under construction or awaiting licenses, urging that no more new plants be
allowed to operate. Still others continued to demonstrate, gathering outside nuclear plants
fi"om coast to coast and waving their by-now-familiar signs; Hell No, We Won't Glow.
No Nukes Is Good Nukes. Today TMI - Tomorrow...? (Stoler, 1985, p. 125)
"But then," as Price wrote, "a new crises diverted attention away from the nuclear
issue." (Price, 1982, p.20) The takeover of the American Embassy in Iran and the
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subsequent crisis over the hostage situation pre-empted the antinuclear movement from
the national media. Demonstrations against nuclear power suddenly declined and
remained small and sporadic all through the following year. And while nuclear power
opposition would continue it would never again hit the fever pitch of the periods just prior
to and after the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.
PACKAGE IDENTIFICATION
As the final period of this study, the events beginning in March, 1979 could be
viewed as the equivalent of the denouement in the progression of antinuclear power
rhetoric. The catalytic event for this period, the accident at Three Miles Island in
Pennsylvania, not only created a tremendous amount of antinuclear discourse, but also
appeared to solidify the antinuclear power movement in the United States. Prior to the
accident, the antinuclear movement appeared to be steadily converging but had not
completely coalesced.
For those opposed to nuclear power, the accident was likely a veritable "horn of
plenty." The accident contained an entire spectrum of potential dangers and problems
which allowed groups opposing different aspects of nuclear power to come together. As a
whole, the accident validated the fears of all of the nuclear power opposition that
potentially disastrous accidents were more than statistical possibilities.
Further, the accident also demonstrated a prophesy-fulfilled for those who had
railed against and vocally opposed nuclear power for many years. Opposition rhetoric in
the preceding period 1973 till 1978, was characterized by an interpretive package called
Devil's Bargain. This package denounced America's commitment to nuclear power as
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more of a bust than boon and prophesied that serious nuclear plant accidents probably
could and would occur. The accident at Three Miles Island very graphically demonstrated
the prophecy come true and established the basis for predicting the likelihood of future
nuclear plant accidents. In essence, if it happened once, it would likely happen again.
The opposition rhetoric which resulted from the accident at Three Mile Island, just
as with the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, also had the potential to provide fuel to
evolve Devil's Bargain into a new package which would blend elements of Devil's
Bargain with rhetoric focusing on the accident. The overall new package that would
emerge could have conceivably been called Prophesy Fulfilled, and might have reflected
the dangers of commitment to nuclear energy combined with an example (Three Mile
Island) of the foreseeable outcome of such a commitment.
As with the example to the Test Ban Treaty, however, rhetoric did not develop
into a new and distinct package during this period. Rather, the antinuclear rhetoric
appears to reflect nearly the opposite - to reflect concerns reminiscent of an earlier
package of antinuclear rhetoric. Three Mile Island provided the impetus for antinuclear
power groups to combine and escalate their activities. But in terms of the overall
movement. Three Mile Island was not the end of nuclear power, but a means to the
possible end of nuclear power.
If Three Mile Island were simply the demise of nuclear power, then certainly the
antinuclear power rhetoric would have claimed victory, stated, "We told you so," and then
faded away. This was not the case however. Rhetoric in this period did reflect elements
of a prophesy fulfilled, but still largely reflected concerns over the safety, cost, and
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radiological hazards of nuclear power. Thus as an interpretive package, rhetoric during
this period regressed into a package which basically resembled a slightly modified Mirage
package.
As such, the rhetoric demonstrated the need to continue to warn the American
public about the potential dangers and economical impacts of nuclear power plants.
Elements of all the earlier packages were also identifiable in this period, reflecting issues of
unknown technologies, commitment and future accidents at nuclear power plants.
Consider the following package which demonstrates the modified Mirage rhetorical
package:
We did not understand what we were getting into with nuclear power. We thought we
could harness it to maintain our standard of living. Now we are committed to it and
will sooner or later have to pay a price of unknown dimension. We have unleased it
but no longer can control it. Nuclear power is a powerful genie that we have
summoned and are now unable to force back into its bottle; a Frankenstein's monster
that might turn on its creator. Nuclear power is a time bomb, waiting to explode.
Nuclear energy is not simply one among several alternative energy sources but
something more elemental. It defies a cost-benefit analysis. Radiation is invisible and
one may be exposed without knowing it; its harmful effects may not show up right
away but may strike suddenly and lethally at some later point. Radiation can create
grotesque mutants. In a religious version, humans have dared to play God in
tampering with the fundamental forces of nature and the universe. He who sows the
wind, reaps the whirlwind.
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CHAPTER?
DISCUSSION
It’s hard to get a handle on what anti-nuclear activists want - aside from the complete
shut-down of the nuclear energy industry.
-- Kuglgar EogjsyLlnsigbL96

"The detailing of key value appeals in gay rights rhetoric for a thirteen-year
period," wrote Darsey, "allows us to make some observations about changes in this
discourse over more than four decades." (Darsey, 1992, p. 58) Similar observations can
be made in this thesis, which examined nearly four decades of antinuclear power rhetoric
from the inception of the nuclear age in 1945 to the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.
Rhetoric which resulted from an opposition to the development of nuclear power
appeared at nearly the same instant as the atomic age was bom. Characterized by the
belief that something inherently dangerous (and not well understood) had been unleashed
onto the world, the rhetoric was distinguish by an interpretive package called Pandora's
Box.
This package, the first antinuclear power package, was identified by an opposition
to the development of atomic power based on a lack of adequate understanding of the
technology and dangers of radiation. As nuclear weapons and power were developed,
scientists gained insights into technology and hazards and antinuclear rhetoric evolved into
a new package that represented the better understanding. This package, called M mge,
persisted for nearly two decades and reflected the growing realizations that nuclear power
was not a particularly safe or cost effective source of electrical energy.
117
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During the 1970s, often considered the peak of antinuclear activity in the United
States, antinuclear power rhetoric evolved from the Mirage package to one entitled
Devil's Bargain. This package, which reflected America's dangerous commitment to
nuclear power, remained the dominant rhetorical package until the accident at Three Mile
Island when a modified version of the Mirage package again became the dominant
package. This progression of antinuclear power packages, examined with the catalytic
events which preceded the rhetoric, allows several general observations, which are
examined below, about the rhetoric pervasive to the nuclear power opposition.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric is Progressive
The rhetorical eras examined by James Darsey (1991) were associated with
catalytic events and were basically internally homogeneous eras. Examining nuclear
power development opposition rhetoric as interpretive packages, which are similar to
Darsey's rhetorical eras, demonstrates that the rhetorical packages are more progressive
than distinctive.
Each interpretive package represents the dominant "flavor" of antinuclear rhetoric
for a corresponding historical period, but those packages are not necessarily separate and
unique within the whole of nuclear power opposition rhetoric. Rather each interpretive
package, excluding the first, is the result of the package preceding it. The Devil's Bargain
package would not have become the dominant interpretive package in its historical period
without the benefit of the knowledge of radiological dangers and costs first dominant in
the Mirage package.
Viewing antinuclear power rhetoric as a series of progressive interpretive packages
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rather than a series of related but distinct eras, may be an indicator of the overall strengths
and weaknesses of the rhetoric. Interpretive packages could be viewed as links that form
a chain that represents on homogeneous antinuclear power rhetoric.
A chain, as the proverb relates, is only as strong as its weakest link. Likewise, a
serious weakness in an earlier package would directly affect the validity or strength of
following interpretive packages, as well as the whole of antinuclear power rhetoric. If, for
instance, the knowledge of radiation or costs which were the basis of the Mirage
package were found to be false, the Devil’s Bargain package would have been untrue
since it reflected a belief that America was committing to a dangerous and financially
unsound form of energy.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric is Synergistic
The progressive feature of interpretive packages from historical periods also gave
antinuclear power rhetoric a synergistic quality. A synergism is the action of two or more
substances, organs, or organisms to achieve an effect of which each is individually
incapable. Another more popular explanation of synergism is that the whole is more than
the sum of the parts.
Each interpretive package of antinuclear rhetoric represents a dominant set of
beliefs which were built, in part, fi'om the dominant beliefs of earlier packages. As such,
the most recent package reflected much of the beliefs found in all of the preceding
packages. The modified Mirage interpretive package contained issues of unknown
technologies, radiation dangers, financial impacts, and commitment to nuclear power.
These individual issues or beliefs may not have been particularly effective as
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rhetorical opposition to nuclear power. Consistently opposing nuclear power
development on the basis that it was an unknown technology, for instance, would have
likely been unsuccessful. Taken all together as a whole, however, the beliefs present a
sound and valid opposition to nuclear power development that offered a wide spectrum of
issues that appealed to a larger segment of the American population.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric Requires Maintenance
This aspect of antinuclear power rhetoric is similar to the maintenance stage that
social movements go through during their life cycles. Distinct catalytic events in the
development of nuclear power provided the opportunity for antinuclear power rhetoric to
evolve into a new interpretive packages. In two instances the packages did evolve, from
Pandora's Box to Mirage and from Mirage to Devil's Bargain. In the final period
examined, however, the rhetoric did not evolve, but regressed to a modified form of an
earlier package, basically from Devil's Bargain back to Mirage.
This did not appear to represent an inability of the rhetoric to evolve into a new
interpretive package, but a maintenance stage that is used to reinforce the beliefs put forth
in earlier dominant packages. Nuclear power and its accompanying issues might have, in
time, faded from the minds of the public, especially when other events overshadowed
nuclear power development. A maintenance period, which likely would appear at
irregular intervals, would function to remind the public and those involved in the
opposition of the potential dangers and problems of nuclear power.
The final period in this study, the year 1979, and the corresponding interpretive
package. Mirage, is likely such a maintenance period. While it was a good opportunity

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

121

for rhetoric which validated the efforts of opposition groups, it was also opportunity to
reinforce why those groups were opposed. This maintenance period was likely both
necessary and wise in the progression of the antinuclear rhetoric. A specific accident at a
single reactor like Three Mile Island could eventually fade fi'om the memory over time.
But, reinforcing issues of safety, environment, cost and commitment served to remind
Americans of the potential problems inherent in the entire commercial nuclear power
industry.
Antinuclear Power Rhetoric Relies on the Unknown
The resulting rhetoric of numerous social movements appears to be based upon an
identifiable problem with an identifiable solution. Systematic discrimination based on race
or religion is wrong, and therefore the solution is to seek equal rights and protection under
the law for all races. Antinuclear rhetoric was the same for the most part, with the
exception that it always presented what could be called an element of the unknown.
The first interpretive package of rhetoric. Pandora's Box, represented an
opposition to nuclear power development because it was a little understood, and likely
uncontrollable technology. Its possible dangers, including those of radiation were
relatively unknown. When the dangers of radiation and financial impacts came to light in
following packages, the unknown element was, what would be the result of America’s
push toward the commitment to nuclear power. When that question was answered in
1979 at Three Mile Island, the unknown element was, what would the future hold now
that serious nuclear plant accidents were a reality?
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Antinuclear Rhetoric Exists Beyond the Media
The popular media in the United States followed the development of nuclear
power, and more specifically, the development of opposition to nuclear power. However,
the media did not appear to follow the opposition, and the opposition rhetoric since its
very beginnings in the United States.
It is important to recognize this since any historian who studied the opposition to
nuclear power in the media, would likely not find a suflBciently large amount in the early
years of its development. It appears this is because earlier nuclear power dissenters were
those likely involved in its development, predominantly the nuclear scientists. Their
objections, as demonstrated by the first period in this thesis, were largely overshadowed
by the abundance of pro-atomic rhetoric following the birth of the atomic age.
Later, environmental groups, other coalitions, and then the general public began to
become involved in the opposition to nuclear power. This was in response to the
explosive growth in nuclear power during the 1960s and early 1970s. The rise in nuclear
power opposition during this period coincided with other social movement events
occurring in the United States to garnish a greater amount of media attention. Finally, the
Three Mile Island accident, probably resulted in the greatest amount, at least for a short
time, of media attention to the antinuclear movement.
The historian who studied the movement via the media might be tempted to
postulate that significant rhetoric began sometime during the later stages of nuclear power
development, and not at the beginning. Therefore, it is important to recognize that
significant antinuclear rhetoric exists beyond that reported in the media, in scientific

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

123

journals, speeches, testimony, historical accounts, memos and other documents.
CONCLUSION
Nearly three and one-half million people live in the shadow of the more than one
hundred commercial reactors that stretch across the country from Maine to Oregon. Like
most Americans, these nuclear neighbors appear to have settled into an uneasy peace with
nuclear power. Some are decidedly pro-nuclear, while others have reservations about the
safety of the plants. Others have gone as far as to organize against nuclear power
development in their communities while others join national groups opposed nuclear
power.
The antinuclear movement," wrote Price, "is one of the most significant social
movements ever to emerge in the United States. Why? The movement has raised issues
of a scope that encompass the gravest problems yet faced by human societies." (p. 141)
The rhetoric which has resulted from nuclear power opposition is equally significant for it
contains the issues, ideologies, ideas, and goals of that movement. The examination of
this rhetoric is further justified by, "its potential contribution to our understanding of the
rhetorical behavior of social moments and of rhetoric in general." (Darsey, p. 44)
The general aim of this thesis was to better understand the rhetoric of the
antinuclear power movement in the United States through a combination of methods
employed by Darsey and Gamson and Modigliani. An examination of antinuclear rhetoric
from 1946 through 1979 demonstrated that progressive interpretive rhetorical packages
could be identified for corresponding historical periods. The historical periods were
segmented by catalatic events which were events important to the development of nuclear
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power as well as opportunities for antinuclear power rhetoric.
Rhetorical packages for the 34-year period were identified as follows; (1)
Pandora's Box, (2) Mirage, (3) Devil's Bargain, and (A) Mirage again. The rhetoric of
nuclear power opposition was also found to be progressive, synergistic, requiring periodic
maintenance, requiring elements of the unknown, and more expansive than that reported in
the media.
In general, this method of examining opposition rhetoric in terms of the historical
events which spawned the rhetoric, is a very interesting and thorough technique that
allowed the examiner to draw conclusions and gain insight into how rhetoric may evolve
or regress relatively independently of its attendant social movement.
This method also appears to be a useful tool for future research of rhetoric across
a given historical period such as the development of nuclear power. For the purposes of
future research, however, some added types of investigation might be made which could
provide additional insights into the nature of nuclear power opposition rhetoric.
First and foremost, future investigations should continue to examine instances of
nuclear power opposition rhetoric which occurred early in the development of nuclear
power. The late 1960s and 1970s appear to be a convenient entry point into the
investigation o f nuclear power opposition rhetoric because of the sheer quantity of
rhetoric which occurred. However, to look at only these decades would be to preclude
what likely could be a large, but not readily apparent, body of nuclear power opposition
rhetoric.
Secondly, future research into nuclear power opposition rhetoric should also
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investigate the origins of rhetorical artifacts. This study relied on a diversity of rhetorical
artifacts primarily to demonstrate the origin and progression of nuclear power opposition
rhetoric. Future research should concentrate on the origin of the rhetorical artifacts in
order to track rhetorical progression across groups across time. An observation in this
study was that opposition rhetoric was much like a torch; lit within the scientific
community, carried by the public, then taken-up again by the scientific community. An
examination of the origins of this rhetoric might demonstrate not only how rhetoric
progresses, but how it progress across different groups across a given period of time.
Third, future nuclear power development opposition rhetoric investigations should
also consider the simultaneous development of nuclear weapons opposition rhetoric. At
several instances in this study, it was pointed out that the development of nuclear weapons
was closely linked to nuclear power development, which affected the development of
opposition rhetoric. Future studies might compare and contrast the development of
nuclear power and nuclear weapons opposition rhetoric. Such an investigation might
prove useful in demonstrating similarities, differences, or relationships between the two
opposition rhetorics.
And finally, future studies should cover a larger historical period. This study
covered 34-years of nuclear power development. Future studies should address the
complete development of nuclear power to the present in order to capture the entire
progression of the attending nuclear power opposition rhetoric. Such an investigation
would fully capture the origin and development of nuclear power opposition and allow the
investigator to draw conclusions about the future development of that rhetoric.
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